

Imagining Sevastopol: History and Postwar Community Construction, 1942-1953

Karl D. Qualls

Dickinson College

After eight months research in Moscow's central archives I thought that I knew a great deal about the reconstruction of Sevastopol (now part of Ukraine) after World War II, but it was not until the conversations on a long train trip on 24-25 December 1996 that I had my first experience listening to the historical tales of the city as told by a resident. For the next six months, each chance encounter in a bar, at a monument or cemetery, on the tram, or along the parade route on Victory Day and the Day of Liberation I was captivated by what Sevastopolites retold as their city's history and the myriad things omitted. Tales of the Crimean War and World War II were first upon the lips of my new acquaintances. Why, however, did so few residents know that the Naval Archive was once a mosque? Why too did men and women who went to the Spartak Sports Club not know that it was once a Karaite Jewish prayer hall (*kenasa*)? How, I wondered, was this selective remembrance of the past so wonderfully constructed?

Since the inception of Bolshevik rule in the Soviet Union, the written word has taken on a power not only to report or inspire, but also to create new ideas, attitudes, and cultures.¹ So too history—or at least the myth of history—has been used to legitimise power and authority.² As Richard Wortman has shown, presentations of power and myth in word, image, and structures were many and complex well before the revolution.³ Although neither the power of the word nor the (ab)use of history was new or unique to Russian culture, historians of the Soviet period have as yet to understand how the many forms of propaganda and political representation worked together, *à la* Wortman.⁴ While that goal is too ambitious at present for this article and author, I will show how local naval and municipal officials in Sevastopol used 'texts' in newspapers,

memorials,⁵ and street names to create a selective history for Sevastopol that defined its own urban biography, local tradition, and sense of community, based on nineteenth-century events rather than the revolutionary period, all the while staying within the bounds of official Soviet culture.⁶ Amir Weiner has pointed out that various post-revolutionary myths lent meanings to a Soviet identity, and in Sevastopol meaning was just as often drawn from its pre-revolutionary heritage as from its Soviet tradition, although they were not mutually exclusive. This should not be surprising since we have so many examples of 1930s ‘Stalinism’ reflecting pre-revolutionary forms.⁷ The present case study has been informed by Weiner’s contention that the war myth helped to erase the horrible memories from the 1930s and George Mosse’s assertion that World War I remembrance mixed mourning with pride in sacrificing for a noble cause.⁸

The title of this paper is drawn from Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*.⁹ Although his short text searched for the roots of nationalism, which do not apply directly to this study, his understanding of a created community is relevant. While the imagined community under investigation here did not necessarily want to be sovereign as in Anderson’s study, it did conceive of a community that was based on its unique history. Sevastopol’s naval and ‘local’ officials carved out a ‘little corner of freedom’ from which they could create their own understanding of the city’s importance, in this case through memorials, monuments, and the renaming of city streets and squares.¹⁰ The ‘saints and martyrs, places of worship, and a heritage to emulate’ were as essential to postwar Sevastopol as they were to the post-World War I memorials that Mosse discussed.¹¹ However, Mosse’s premise is that in defeated nations with high losses, the ‘Myth of the War Experience’ concealed the realities of war and legitimised the sacrifices and thus strengthened nationalism. The USSR was victorious, but the cost was greater than all World War I combatants combined. Likewise, the horrors of war and the sacrifice of life

and property had to be legitimised. In Sevastopol, although the memorials raised by military and municipal officials clearly supported the Soviet cause, the war myth was steeped in local feats of heroism. Expressions of local culture, history, and tradition throughout the war and postwar period speak to a growing sense of a particularist idea of community derived from a connection to the urban environment and sites of remembrance. Monuments, cemeteries, and place names, in addition to serving as sites of mourning, carried the image of sacrifice and served as didactic tools with which to instruct the workers in the rubble about past residents' heroic exploits for their city. How typical Sevastopol was in this regard is still unclear, but Christel Lane's summary of the studies of local patriotic rituals in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s suggests that Sevastopol was not alone.¹²

Whose History is Our History?

In 1783, Catherine the Great established the city of Sevastopol on the site of the ancient Greek city of Khersones/Chersonesus (Aktiar for the Turks) as a Russian trading port and naval outpost and a bastion against invasion. It and the surrounding region had served as a trading port for Greeks, Tatars, eastern Slavs, and others since the fifth century BCE. More recently, especially before World War II, Russians, Turks, and Europeans remembered Sevastopol as the tortuous battleground of the Crimean War. The costly war of attrition against disease as much as enemy fire became a focal point of the city's image.¹³ Beginning with mutinies in the Black Sea Fleet in 1905 and 1917 and continuing with an insurrection in 1919 against General Petr Wrangel and his men, Sevastopol gained a reputation as a bastion of the revolution and defender of Soviet power. Moreover, the stalwart defence against Hitler's month-long bombardment in June 1942 and the nearly two-year German occupation left Sevastopol in ruins and created an

indelible mark on the city's history. Of the 110,000 prewar residents, only 3,000 remained until liberation.¹⁴

Operation Barbarossa, the German attack on the Soviet Union, became yet another touchstone for fortress Sevastopol. Like the sailors who had established Soviet power in the city, their successors had to defend both Sevastopol and the nation from German invaders. However, after the lightning-quick and highly destructive Nazi offensive against Sevastopol in November and December 1941, mythmakers in the Soviet press began to link defence against the Nazis to the heroic mid-nineteenth century defence of the city.¹⁵ The connection between the two defences heralded a particular urban biography, which often usurped the prominence of the Bolshevik revolution and the establishment of Soviet power.

Connections between the 'Second Great Defence' (World War II) and the first (Crimean War) emerged from the pens of journalists, writers, and military and political officers in the days of the siege. As Vice-Admiral F. S. Oktiabrskii, commander in charge of Sevastopol's defence, reminded his readers in 1942, 'in good time will these deeds of the numberless heroes of the Second Defence of Sevastopol be woven into a brilliant fabric of legend, poem, verse and song by the Soviet people and its poets.'¹⁶ When Oktiabrskii wrote about the 'Second Defence of Sevastopol' the Soviet reader (and some of the British and French allies no doubt) understood that the first defence occurred during the Crimean War. Numerous writers linked the war against Hitler's Germany with past valorous campaigns, but no battles were more important to the city's image than the Crimean War. Vice-Admiral Oktiabrskii made a direct link between the two defences when he said:

To the glorious deeds of heroism performed by our fathers in the battles of Chesma, Sinope and Ochakov, during the first defence of Sevastopol, we have

added the feats of the champions of this heroic epoch, which we call the

Second Defence of Sevastopol.¹⁷

As commander of the defence, Oktiabrskii had reason to point to a long tradition of resisting invasion.¹⁸ As he was putting pen to paper in 1942, German forces were sweeping Soviet power off the Crimean Peninsula. Oktiabrskii needed to show that his troops had fought hard and that, as during the Crimean War, the invaders would be repelled. The losses in both defences were extraordinary, and this history soon became ‘ours.’

Sevastopol’s reflection on its past did not end after the Red Army liberated the city in May 1944. The first issues of the local party/government newspaper, *Slava Sevastopolia* (Glory of Sevastopol), carried an occasional column entitled ‘From the History of Sevastopol’ that presented factual history as well as accounts of past military glory. The name of the newspaper itself is instructive, but *Slava* had long been Sevastopol’s main source of news, which showed that ‘glory’ meant something to the reading public in the city even before the Second World War and that postwar journalism merely built on an existing trait of the urban community. The underground partisan newspaper *Za Rodinu!* (For the Homeland!) briefly replaced *Slava* during occupation, but the municipal newspaper never stooped to becoming ‘Red’ anything, as was common in the USSR. Although the title suggests a shift from local to national, it is equally clear that it hails local achievements in defending the homeland. Most of the earliest postwar columns in both newspapers touched on tales from the Crimean War, linking the present battle against Nazi Germany to the heroic defence a century earlier.¹⁹ The newspaper of the Black Sea Fleet, *Krasnyi Chernomorets* (Red Black Sea Sailor) on the day before liberation, ran an article simply entitled ‘Sevastopol’ that not only detailed the fierce fighting in and around the city, but also retold the city’s ancient Greek and Turkic origins and the importance of Prince Potemkin-

Tavrisheskii in selecting the site for the base of Catherine the Great's Black Sea naval port in 1783.²⁰

During the war it was necessary to show soldiers and partisans that they were part of a long tradition, but also that they were fighting for more than meaningless buildings and streets. Homes, families, traditions, and a way of life had to be defended. In the days following liberation as the first sailors and residents made their way back to the city, the naval newspaper described the 'glory of the Russian soul' by combining the stories of Crimean War heroes like admirals P. S. Nakhimov and V. A. Kornilov, sailor Petr Koshka, and nurse Dasha Sevastopolskaia with the new heroes of the second defence Ivan Golubets, Ludmilla Pavlichenko, the Five Black Sea Men and more.²¹ Thus, even if the population while in the rear had not heard about the heroic defence, which is highly unlikely, official remembrance marked their return to the city. Local heroes were held up as examples of something typically 'Russian.' The effort to educate people about the distant and recent past of the city continued well into 1945 and beyond. For example, the fleet held a lecture entitled 'The Historical Past of Sevastopol' for the families of new and returning servicemen, which was followed by the docudrama film *Battle for Sevastopol*.²²

Although statistics are elusive, non-residents who were likely unfamiliar with the city's history contributed much to Sevastopol's rapid repopulation.²³ With so much of the prewar population evacuated, at the front, or killed, access to labour became a major bottleneck for reconstruction.²⁴ German POWs formed one of the largest labour pools. Although it is impossible to determine the precise number of captured soldiers in Sevastopol, a 1945 report of the main municipal construction trust (*Sevastopolstroii*) hinted at the prevalence of German labour. For example, of the 2,868 workers who received training in the department of cadres,

2,045 were POWs. Over one-third of those who improved their training were also German soldiers.²⁵ In a July 1945 report on the production of its various units, Sevastopolstroi reported that POWs accounted for 87.6 per cent of the work.²⁶ In August, a plan was drafted to add 20,000 more POWs to Sevastopolstroi's workforce from the sixteen camps in the city, its outskirts, and throughout Crimea.²⁷

Despite this captive labour, the scale of destruction demanded much more. Volunteer labour made up another significant part of the population. These mostly young men and women, often affiliated with Communist youth groups, entered the rubble of Sevastopol with a true desire to rebuild the heroic city. However, because of the extensive use of German POW labour and 'volunteers' (i.e. recruits) from once occupied areas of Moldova and Ukraine, one can surmise that the number of true volunteers fell far short of the city's needs. The presence of the newcomers in Sevastopol threatened a sense of community that, if allowed to continue unchecked, may have slowed the process of rebuilding the city. In order to encourage sacrifice for the reconstruction effort from new and returning residents alike, naval, municipal, and cultural officials began to focus public attention on Sevastopol's past as defender, against all odds, of Russia and the Soviet Union. With so much of the new labour force coming from sources outside of the prewar population, creating a community of residents was daunting, but an imagined community was in many ways easier. However, the scale of damage and influx of non-residents also made it easier to create a sanitized community ignorant of Jewish and Tatar history in the city.

History in Stone

Following the themes of writers and filmmakers, Soviet architects redesigned Sevastopol's postwar urban landscape, which both reflected, and revised, the heroic myth of the city. Because German bombs and shells shattered the city's landmarks (e.g. piers, ships, and monuments), architects set out to recreate Sevastopol's mythology through restoration and new memorial architecture. The conscious German attack on the ships and ports of Sevastopol was more than a military exercise;²⁸ it was the destruction of a long-held image as Catherine's bastion against the Turks; as the fortress that thwarted the incursion of British, French, and Turkish mariners; and as the home of sailors who mutinied for the revolution. As one writer on Stalingrad put it, postwar city planning served 'to develop a series of architectural-planning tasks in connection with its [city's] *historical* and *social* significance.'²⁹ Sevastopol's historical significance as an outpost against invasion was clear and so was its significance as the main Black Sea port. The theoretical journal of the Academy of Architecture later reminded architects that: '*Memorial architecture* acquires enormous significance in restored cities. Arches, obelisks, monumental memorials will have here not only agitational and memorial significance, but also will play a large role in the creation of an expressive city silhouette.'³⁰ While one might debate the aesthetic merits of much memorial architecture, its 'agitational and memorial significance' cannot be doubted. While monuments served as places of remembrance and mourning, they also served to agitate and instruct.

Visual images of heroic struggle, self-sacrifice, and the long history of Sevastopol moved from the page and found a new face in the city's monuments, buildings, streets, parks, and squares. Planners realized it was 'impossible to ignore the historical appearance of a city when planning restoration' or 'to ignore our [Russian] national heritage.'³¹ During the war Stalin had

conjured up the heroes and institutions of Russia's past to rebuild 'national' unity.³² David Brandenberger contends that in Stalin's USSR 'national [primarily Russian] heroes, myths and imagery were seen as being able to popularise the more arcane and obscurantist aspects of Marxist-Leninism.'³³ This was precisely the case for most monuments in postwar Sevastopol. The city's traditional heritage, highlighted in the wartime press, came alive after liberation as old monuments and memorials were restored and new ones were erected alongside them. The same impetus led to memorials and monuments to rebuild a 'local' identity. Architects built monuments symbolizing the heroic defeat of the 'fascist invaders' among restored memorials to the heroes of the past. The geographic relation of images, moreover, created a symbolic link between past and present in an effort to create a future image for the city of Sevastopol. In Sevastopol the outdoor museum culture stressed the continuity across the revolution and highlighted Sevastopol's tradition as part of a larger Russian/Soviet identity and served as an example of ideal behaviour for the city's newest residents battling to rebuild.³⁴

Because urban reconstruction quickly became mired in political confrontation, local and military officials (while critiquing the general plans emanating from Moscow) began raising memorials on their own. As President Mikhail Kalinin said, 'the contingencies of the moment may justify the omission of certain conveniences in the building of temporary accommodations,'³⁵ but memorialisation proceeded without careful planning and central funding and was far from temporary. On 8 April 1943 the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) created the Committee on Architectural Affairs (KA), which had as its main task the 'architectural and planning work for the restoration of cities and other populated areas of the city type destroyed by the German invaders.' As a sign of the importance of non-war-directed construction and preservation, Sovnarkom elaborated only on the rubric of architectural

structures: 'triumphal arches, obelisks, columns, and others.'³⁶ The emphasis on obelisks underscored the regime's desire to memorialise and to recreate a mythology for the cities under construction. When considering the staggering amount of reconstruction needed in cities like Sevastopol, memorialisation served to connect viewers with a past history of sacrifice against all odds for a greater good. Like newspapers and films, monuments of all types served to instruct as much as to facilitate remembrance. One could approach a monument in deference to all those lost and remember a loved one, yet one could also take the example of sacrifice preserved in stone and apply it to one's daily work in resurrecting the city.

Sevastopol, which the Red Army liberated thirteen months after the watershed Sovnarkom resolution, received its first indication that it would be reborn on 9 August 1944. Boris Rubanenko, deputy chair of the KA, sent a brief note to one Sud'bin of the navy's Central Planning Bureau informing him that a closed competition for the city plan of postwar Sevastopol had to be completed by 15 November, although that deadline was consistently postponed.³⁷ Thus, from the start, naval and architectural officials both worked on the reconstruction of the city, although not always for the same goals.³⁸ While central planning continued at a snail's pace, new administrations were being created at all levels of government to oversee the preservation and creation of monuments and memorials. On 24 October 1944 the Russian government set forth a statute for lower levels of architectural administration that mandated a division for the preservation of memorial architecture, a 'bureau of experts,' and more.³⁹ Archival evidence suggests that the oblast architectural administration, not to mention the central administration, knew little about what was occurring in Sevastopol. A. N. Ivanov, head of the Crimean Administration of Architectural Affairs, wrote on 18 November 1944 to Vasiliï Efremov, head of the city administration, and G. A. Lomagin, the chief municipal architect,

demanding photographs and texts about all of the city's monuments, especially those commemorating the second defence, which had been appearing at the behest of the military immediately after liberation.⁴⁰ Three days later a similar letter went out to all Crimean cities requesting a list of monuments of architecture, uses, conditions, and steps for restoration and preservation.⁴¹ Thus, local officials became empowered by their control of information. From this moment they not only supplied data, but also began to contest and modify central plans to fit a local heritage.⁴²

Only in late 1945 did the Crimean Committee on Architecture finally issue a list of structures to be protected and preserved.⁴³ Although the archival trail is less than complete on this issue, one can surmise that the city administration and chief architect heeded the November 1944 request from Ivanov and sent a list of structures to the oblast capital. What was added and deleted we may never know, but in March 1946, when *Slava Sevastopolia* published the oblast committee's decision four other sites appeared on the list and were recognized for their architectural and historic importance: Vladimir Cathedral, St. Michael's Admiralty Church and the adjacent military-historical museum, and the Monument to Scuttled Ships of the Crimean War.⁴⁴ Although the latter three are clearly tied to the Crimean War and therefore important symbols of the city's history, Vladimir Cathedral on the central hill was added no doubt because the bodies of Crimean War leaders E. I. Totleben, V. I. Istomin, V. A. Kornilov, and P. S. Nakhimov are interred in the vault below the sanctuary. Somewhere in the chain of decision-making, likely from the debates over the city's reconstruction, it must have been noted that these additional structures were essential to the city's image.

The contestation over the fate of the Vladimir Cathedral is most instructive. When Grigorii Barkhin, a prominent Moscow architect, had been granted the commission to redesign

the city he prepared an elaborate restructuring of the city into an outdoor museum.⁴⁵ Working for the fleet, Barkhin had planned to raze the entire central hill, including Vladimir Cathedral, to make way for a new ensemble of buildings for the navy. A local review committee composed of naval and civilian representatives that included architects, engineers, a physician, the head of the city planning bureau, air defence, and fire control met at the end of 1945 and argued vehemently against Barkhin's plan. The local committee stated that the Cathedral should be restored and, moreover, that the entire scale of his project was out of line with the city's character.⁴⁶ One specific reason noted by the committee was that they feared Barkhin's new ensemble would overshadow the Parthenon-like Peter and Paul Cathedral adjacent to the proposed construction. Only after the local committee was formed in October 1945 was a plan to preserve the cathedral articulated. What is most telling is that despite the fact that over one third of the committee membership came from the navy, it rejected plans to enlarge a naval complex at the expense of the Vladimir Cathedral.⁴⁷ Local naval and civilian officials were able to alter the plan of the Moscow architect selected to redesign Sevastopol and promote a mutually shared image of Sevastopol as a long-time naval bastion, and it appears that this image and tradition was more important to the navy than expanding its own administrative facilities.

There could be four possible reasons that the local team wanted to preserve the Cathedral: religious, architectural, memorial, or traditional. Since no one in the debates ever discussed Vladimir Cathedral as a functioning church, we can rule out the religious argument. Engineers and military specialists were likely little concerned with the aesthetic importance of architecture. Moreover, because the Crimean Committee on Architecture's original 1945 list of important *architectural* monuments omitted the cathedral, one can conclude that it was not highly valued despite being designed by the well-known architect K. A. Ton. One could argue that the

committee omitted it because of its religious significance, but the inclusion of other churches seems to undermine that assumption. Memorial and traditional significance are the only other possibilities, and in this case it appears that they worked hand in hand. Municipal and naval authorities sought to direct the local community toward a particular history that highlighted heroism, sacrifice, and defence of the city and Russia and the Soviet Union.

Tradition and Memorials

Sevastopol had long been a city of memorials and monuments and maintaining that tradition became paramount in the postwar period. The city's monuments and memorials created visible connections between past and present, and Sevastopol's first monument set the tone for future military engagements and their immortalisation.⁴⁸ From 1834 to 1839 architect A. P. Briullov, brother of the famous painter Karl Briullov, planned and completed a monument to the ship *Mercury* and its commander A. I. Kazarskii and their battle against the Turks. A bronze model of an ancient ship was placed atop a pyramid with the inscription: 'To Kazarskii. An Example for Posterity' (*Kazarskomu. Potomstvu v primer*). His example, victory despite being outnumbered and overmatched by superior weaponry, would hold true for both of the defences to come.

The Crimean War in Sevastopol brought death to many in the city, but it also created heroes and heroines who became 'examples' for future generations. Many notables from the Crimean War ring the facade of the Panorama of the Great Defence of 1854-1855 on Historical Boulevard in the city centre. From Admiral Nakhimov to young journalist Lev Tolstoy to Dasha Sevastopolskaia (the Russian Florence Nightingale), all sacrificed their energies, and some their lives, to protect Mother Russia and her people. As in most wars, the common people were often

forgotten as the leaders became immortalized in stone and bronze. Sevastopol's 1,200 statues and monuments include many military leaders from the Crimean War: Nakhimov, Istomin, Kornilov, and Totleben, among many others; but the plight of the average citizen was also celebrated, as in the bust of Sevastopolskaia and the memorial graves in the Fraternal Cemetery. The memorial park at Malakhov Kurgan likewise commemorated the great battle, not just its leaders. Several monuments around the city remind visitors and residents alike of collective effort. All the city's bastions, for example, have their own memorials. No structure, however, is more loved, revered, and cherished than the Monument to Scuttled Ships, which honours the sailors who sank their ships at the mouth of the bay to prevent their Crimean War adversaries from getting close enough to shell the city centre.

After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Sevastopol began to erect monuments to its revolutionary heroes too. From the 1905 mutinies in the tsar's navy to the Bolshevik Red Army's battle against the old guard White Army in the Civil War, new revolutionary heroes joined the obligatory statue of Lenin. In 1935 Lieutenant P. P. Shmidt and his comrades were immortalized in a pink, marble, five-cornered star for leading the mutiny of 1905 and subsequently dying in front of the tsar's firing squad on 6 March 1906. Two years later sculptor M. A. Sadovskii honoured the 'Forty-nine Communards' who participated in the underground battle against the White Army in 1919-1920. Throughout the 1930s similar monuments sprang up to honour I. D. Sladkov, military commissar of naval forces during the civil war, and other young communists who brought 'Soviet power' to the city. These men, central to the revolutionary image of the city, while not forgotten, were soon relegated to a distant third behind the heroes of the two defences.

In addition to preservation, new memorials to the second defence were erected in the city, often in the same ensembles commemorating the Crimean War, thus making the comparisons all the more tangible. The fight over Sevastopol's usable past was not without contestation, however. Local officials often led the charge against central plans that challenged tradition. For example, in Grigorii Barkhin's earliest drafts he suggested that the Crimean War panorama, or what remained of it, be disassembled and moved from Historical Boulevard to Malakhov Kurgan and erected alongside a new panorama to the second defence. This idea came from his competitor and fellow Moscow architect and professor Moisei Ginzburg who stated in early 1945 that the 'most honourable task in the reconstruction of Sevastopol must be the reflection of the heroic spirit [*geroika*] of the city by the monumental means of architecture and sculpture.'⁴⁹ A. N. Ivanov and G. A. Lomagin, respectively the heads of the oblast and city architectural administrations, rejected Barkhin's plan in March 1945, which led V. A. Shkvarikov, head of the Russian architectural administration, days later to direct Lomagin to work on a new scheme with Barkhin.⁵⁰ Two separate commissions, following the lead of local and regional officials, also rejected Barkhin's general plan because it did not account for the 'significance and the natural conditions of the territory.'⁵¹ An expert review commission again criticized much of Barkhin's reworked proposal in early April 1945 noting that he 'ignored the specifics of the city.'⁵²

As Barkhin continued to modify his proposal throughout the summer and fall to accommodate many of the critiques, the plan for two panoramas remained, and so did the criticism. Lomagin in July and again in October criticized Barkhin's plan for Malakhov Kurgan. In his latter critique, he suggested that Barkhin preserve the traditional location of existing memorials and monuments and spread new ones throughout the city to mark historical places rather than concentrate them all in one large outdoor museum and memorial park.⁵³ Each heroic

feat needed its own symbol and each city region needed monuments to keep the images and messages fresh in viewers' minds. At the same October meeting one Kvochkin from the Engineering Department of the fleet criticized numerous plans for monuments and advised Barkhin to consult the Political Directorate of the fleet for all questions regarding the panorama and memorials. Three days later, on 16 October 1945, a naval commission headed by Admiral Oktiabrskii argued that all Crimean War memorials should be preserved in their original locations. Furthermore, the admiral and the commission advised 'the naming of squares and main streets of Sevastopol take into account the historical events and names of the organizers and heroes of the two defences of Sevastopol.'⁵⁴ Thus, local architectural and naval officials sunk Moscow's plans for a completely new form of commemoration, preferring instead to preserve traditional sites of remembrance and add new monuments to honour the latest sacrifices.

Local and naval officials had constructed a new matrix for the remembrance of history and heroes. In effect, however, they were only articulating a process that had been occurring without planning. From the first days after liberation monuments and memorials to World War II began to pop up throughout the city, often at the navy's behest, to mark significant sites of battle. Municipal officials, who technically had jurisdiction over most of the territory (ports remained controlled by the navy), did nothing to interfere largely because naval memorialisation fostered identification with the city's lore as well.

Taking their cue from over one hundred years of memorialising war heroes, architects, sculptors, and military engineers executed an extraordinary number of statues and plaques in the months after liberation. Postwar politics and policy, however, forbade the exaltation of individuals, except one--Stalin. Therefore, during the first postwar decade, most monuments honoured groups of men and women who showed superlative courage and sacrifice under fire

and lived up to Kazarskii's 'Example for Posterity.' Just a matter of days after the German forces had fled the city in May 1944, naval architects and engineers raised the first monuments to commemorate heroic feats. A. D. Kiselev erected the first monument--a twelve-meter high obelisk made from local Inkerman stone to the soldiers of the 318th Novorossiisk Division.⁵⁵ The location of this first monument on Gornaia Heights at a common grave to the city's defenders where the 318th had secured a hill overlooking the city, marked the site as near holy ground, where the blood of soldiers had flowed for Sevastopol's liberation. The obelisk structure, in addition, hints at the lack of money and resources that could be spared as Soviet forces continued their march toward Berlin. The speed with which this task was accomplished, however, suggests a need or desire to make tangible the efforts of the latest group of heroes who had prevailed against all odds.

Throughout 1944, more obelisks began to dot the horizon, marking sites of battle for reverence and pilgrimage. In July, K. Chankvetadze designed, and soldiers and engineers constructed, a twelve-meter high obelisk in honour of the Second Guards Army on a common grave.⁵⁶ Four months later Lieutenant Commander Zedgenidze erected a 2.5 meter monument on the spot where many of the defenders of the Konstantinovskii Ravelin were killed. As war continued and resources remained scarce, grandeur and monumentality were reserved for the sites most memorable to the city's new lore: the 'Victory' monument at Cape Khersones where the last German soldiers left Crimea and the 'Glory' obelisk at Sapun Gora where the Red Army staged an uphill assault to recapture Sevastopol. Fifteen years after the obelisk on Sapun Gora was first erected, a new diorama/museum was opened nearby giving it a parallel significance to the Crimean War's Panorama on Historical Boulevard. With war still raging, money, specialists, and skilled labour could not be utilized for great art. Only after economic recovery could

resources be devoted to the much more expensive diorama and museum, but this did not preclude the need and desire for remembrance. The military had taken memorialization into its own hands by marking sites of remembrance that would be 'examples for posterity.' The theme of collective action and sacrifice merged well with Soviet themes and continued the glorification of the city and its defenders.

Rarely did monuments in the postwar period emphasize the feats of individuals, but when they did they were given a place of honor and often located close together in cemeteries that could be used as outdoor museums and classrooms. One gunboat sailor, Ivan Golubets, received his own monument because he, better than most, exemplified Kazarskii's motto 'Example for Posterity.' In March 1942, Golubets jumped on board a ship engulfed in flames by German shells. Fearing the loss of several ships moored nearby, Golubets, the story goes, began to throw depth charges overboard to prevent explosion. His valiant efforts were not fast enough and he was killed in the ensuing blast. The square-faced obelisk to a Hero of the Soviet Union is topped by a naval symbol and decorated with anchors at its base, a bas-relief of Golubets, and a commemorative plaque. Only a heroic, sacrificial act to protect one's Motherland and comrades could be singled out in an era of an intense personality cult.

More often the military raised monuments to itself (as in most of the above examples) or collectively honored its leaders who had fallen in battle. It is instructive to note that none of Sevastopol's military leaders were so honored during their lives, and even Lenin had to wait until 1957 for his destroyed statue to be replaced. However, dead defenders could be honored and memorialised in busts, plaques, and statues. In November 1946, with the military still celebrating its victory, an Inkerman stone obelisk with bronze bas-reliefs was raised on the Cemetery of Communards honouring Air Force generals and Heroes of the Soviet Union N.

Ostriakov (aviation commander of the Black Sea Fleet) and F. Korobkov (deputy chief of naval aviation) along with Brigade Commissar of air forces for the Black Sea Fleet M. Stepanenko. All three men died in 1941-1942. The Fraternal Cemetery of the Third Anniversary of the Liberation of Crimea (more commonly known as the Cemetery of Communards) was constructed in 1923 to commemorate the liberation of the peninsula from the White Army and German forces in the Civil War. However, the new cemetery, established on the location of the Fifth Bastion, also connected visitors to the city's Crimean War past. This action by the military set a precedent to be followed for decades: 'important' people in the city's history would be buried together, which would facilitate the instruction of visitors (especially school-age children) in their city's history. In addition to military heroes like Oktiabrskii (1899-1969), hero-labourers of reconstruction like Evgenii Kolobov (1912-1973) and Nikolai Muzika (1927-1963), and political figures like B. A. Borisov (1903-1980), who was First Party Secretary during the war, were interred side by side. All those who were 'examples for posterity' were honored after their death and served as symbols of people who sacrificed for their city in times of great need.

Educating the public about the city's history and traditions became paramount. As early as November 1944 A. N. Ivanov of the Crimean Administration for Architectural Affairs instructed all municipal architects to give lectures, reports, excursions, and radio and newspaper interviews on the significance of monuments and memorials.⁵⁷ Although radio transcripts have not been located, local newspapers were filled with the articles of chief architect Iurii Trautman, stories on the city's history, and coverage of lectures by city officials. Moreover, school-age children took trips to sites as part of the regular curriculum and were further enlightened by veterans and local historians and educators in Pioneer camps and 'children's areas.'⁵⁸ The question of reception is particularly difficult in this case⁵⁹ because children often did not write

independently about their experiences, none of the memoirs from the period can be taken as objective and are overly party-centred, and personal interviews conducted in the city in 1996-1997 showed the difficulty residents had articulating what the city and its history meant for them in the immediate postwar period because of the desperation of their present lives.⁶⁰ However, an excursion clearly demonstrates that Oktiabrskii's prediction that the 'numberless heroes of the Second Defence of Sevastopol be woven into a brilliant fabric of legend' came true.⁶¹

The Politics of Geography

Oktiabrskii's 1945 recommendation mentioned above that 'the naming of squares and main streets of Sevastopol take into account the historical events and names of the organizers and heroes of the two defences of Sevastopol'⁶² also came to fruition. While it is too reductionist to assume that Oktiabrskii's opinion was law, and in fact it coincides with a renewed interest by other city officials in redefining what 'local' meant, his position as head of the fleet and his status as commander during the war obviously carried weight.

After Moscow architect Grigorii Barkhin was removed from the planning project the nomenclature of city landmarks often paid homage to Crimean War heroes. Perhaps taking Oktiabrskii's recommendations into account, new municipal architect Iurii Trautman and his team set about re-naming the city's most prominent streets and squares.⁶³ The naming and renaming of streets, squares, and parks was an integral part of the postwar programme of urban agitation and identification. Name changes suggested political shifts as well. After the revolution, no one should have been surprised that Catherine the Great had her street renamed for Lenin (as it remains today). The Soviet obsession with making the revolution omnipresent led to the three streets of the ring road taking the names of Lenin, Marx, and Frunze. During postwar

replanning, however, the latter two reverted to Bol'shaia Morskaia (Big Naval) Street and Nakhimov Prospect. When judged as part of a larger plan, this transformation heralded a new emphasis on local identity, historical depth, and national pride. Frunze was essential to Sevastopol's 'liberation' from the Germans and Whites after the revolution, but he was not considered a 'local' hero. Marx, of course, had no direct link to the city, only its ruling ideology. Admiral Nakhimov, on the other hand, stood atop the pantheon of heroes from the Crimean War. Bol'shaia Morskaia, much more than Marx, carried the city's image as a naval, both military and commercial, port. Although reverting to pre-revolutionary names could be viewed as abandoning socialist goals, it was more important to the city's stability and rapid reconstruction to resurrect a unique, local character to which residents could attach their ideals and aspirations. Moreover, the lessons of the Crimean War were quite instructive and supported more prevalent Soviet tropes of duty, sacrifice, and fighting against all odds for the Motherland. Therefore, an emphasis on local identity did not necessarily undermine a Soviet identity.

The names of the city's central squares also went through a radical transformation. Nakhimov Square replaced the Square of the Third International, which Barkhin had tentatively called Parade Square. Neither an institution of world socialism nor the martial and functional nature of the square was acceptable; only the name of the city's greatest admiral could adorn the square closest to the sea. Commune Square (the pre-revolutionary Novoselskaia) reverted to the name of another naval hero, Admiral Ushakov. Even the Great October Revolution fell victim to the desire to make Sevastopol's naval history ever-present. After World War II Revolutionary Square took the name of M. P. Lazarev, commander of the Black Sea Fleet at the end of the eighteenth century. The nomenclature of Sevastopol's streets and squares highlighted the city's pre-revolutionary tradition. The navy, as the most visible institution in the city, was well placed

on review boards, and, with the cooperation of local civilian leaders, were able to bring to Sevastopol a city steeped in its pre-revolutionary naval tradition. Knowing full well that honouring living heroes would be a direct challenge to the Stalin cult, they chose instead to honor the dead of World War II and, by linking it to the Crimean War, show that the citizens and sailors had had a long and glorious tradition of defending the Motherland.

The process of renaming and reapportioning buildings also highlighted the historical omissions so important to creating a selective understanding of Sevastopol's history. Two significant parts of Sevastopol's history failed to survive the war: Jewish and Tatar. The war had created a more Slavic city; Crimean Tatars had been deported en masse for alleged collaboration with the Germans, and Karaite Jews suffered like most European Jews under Hitler. Moreover, the postwar period brought renewed anti-Semitism to the USSR.⁶⁴ Thus, postwar planners did not have to give special consideration to Sevastopol's multi-ethnic heritage in reconstructing the city and its image. Eliminating the remnants of collaborators and 'anti-Soviet cosmopolitans' (the catchphrase for Jews) became paramount. The Tatar Settlement (*Tatarskaia slobodka*) became known as Green Hillock (*Zelënaia gorka*). The kenasa, a Karaite Jewish prayer hall, became the Spartak sports club; the Tatar mosque, with minarets removed and the façade 'erased' of Koranic inscriptions, became the naval archive, despite one construction unit's request for the building for its new social club. Reversion to tradition meant a Russian ethnic identity wrapped in a Greek architectural façade reminiscent of the 2500-year-old ruins at nearby Khersones, yet devoid of all hints of competing identities. Replacing Jews and Tatars with a sports club and a naval building focused the city's image on strength and service. Local unity demanded visual and historical unity, too.

Conclusions

Every element from geographic location and nomenclature to architectural style and memorials were designed to give Sevastopol a unique image within a larger context. Although many still believed in the egalitarian ideals of socialism, the social disruptions of the 1930s had perverted them beyond recognition and abandoned what many felt was the true nature of socialism.⁶⁵ The men and women who repopulated the city immediately after liberation in May 1944 set about rebuilding their homes and lives. The navy, by far the most visible institution in the city, and local officials took advantage of central officials' distractions with war and cataclysmic and widespread destruction throughout the western reaches of the USSR to articulate and make tangible their vision of Sevastopol's past, present, and future. As the defence of the city collapsed in 1942, military officials had already started linking the two defences of the Crimean War and World War II. After liberation in May 1944 the trend continued and the military constructed memorials to honor its feats and the lives sacrificed, which continued an established tradition and highlighted the city's heritage as well. Military and civilian officials fought against 'outsider' tendencies that wanted to change the nature of the city and stressed a continuous local tradition as heroes of the second defence were laid to rest next to heroes of the past. With press coverage, educational excursions, ever-present memorials, and the renaming of streets and squares, residents and visitor alike were steeped in the city's naval heritage.

The 'dominant myth,' to borrow Amir Weiner's phrase⁶⁶ was military service, but unlike Weiner's study which showed that one's service during World War II allowed for many sins to be forgiven, the city of Sevastopol also had a 'metamyth' that sought to project the image of an imagined urban community. The impetus for rebuilding Sevastopol was similar to David

Brandenberger's idea that a revival of past heroic events and people served as a surrogate to a larger Soviet goal.⁶⁷ However, for Sevastopol the revival of history was more than merely 'russocentrism' as Brandenberger has discussed, rather it was based on *local* heroes who had also served a larger Russian/Soviet community through their defence of the homeland. This version of 'history' complimented the objectives of naval and local officials. Thus, a stronger connection with local history and tradition through monuments and renamed streets, often at the expense of glorifying the USSR, likely was much more effective in creating stability and a sense of mission than abstract Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. This, however, remains to be proven, yet conversations with Sevastopolites about the city's history will no doubt give the reader, as they did the author, an unscientific understanding of how important the city's history is to residents even today.

My thanks to the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the American Council of Teachers of Russian, and the Center for the Study of Russia and the Soviet Union for financial and administrative support of this project. This article has benefited from the insightful comments of colleagues, particularly Ron Suny and Sheila Fitzpatrick who read a draft presented in 2000 at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

¹ Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Vera Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).

² David Brandenberger, 'The "Short Course" to Modernity: Stalinist History Textbooks, Mass Culture and the Formation of Popular Russian National Identity, 1934-1956', (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1999).

³ Richard Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy* 2 vols, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 2000).

⁴ Although a great deal of research has been done on art and propaganda, none approaches Wortman's breadth and depth. See, among others, Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); idem, *Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917-1953*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); James von Geldern, *Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Abbott Gleason, Peter Kenez, and Richard Stites, eds., *Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

⁵ The Russian word *pamiatnik* can be translated as either 'memorial' or 'monument.' Although 'memorial' is more commemorative, the English words will be used interchangeably.

⁶ The most well-known western work on memorial commemoration of World War II is Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia*, (New York: Basic Books, 1994), which fails to show the local dimensions of the war 'cult' and how it varied by locality. Moreover, her insistence that Stalin was at the centre of the cult of war simply does not hold true at the local level. Sevastopol, for example, never had even a modest statue to Stalin.

⁷ For just a few examples of how privilege crept back into the 'classless' society, see Dunham, *In Stalin's Time*; Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'Ascribing Class: The Construction of Social Identity in Soviet Russia,' *Journal of Modern History*, 65, December 1993, pp. 745-770; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s*, (New York: Oxford, 1999), chapter 4; Lewis Siegelbaum, *Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941*, (New York: Cambridge, 1988); and the classic text Nicholas Timasheff, *The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia*, (New York: Dutton, 1946). Karen Petrone has recently added to this growing body of literature with her analysis of, for example, the Pushkin Centennial and other celebrations in the 1930s. See her, *Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).

⁸ Amir Weiner has made the clearest articulation of this point in 'The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity,' *Russian Review*, 55, October 1996, pp. 638-660. Weiner argues that World War II created a supranational and multiethnic ethos that allowed particularistic, but not oppositional, identities. Elaboration can be found in his *Making Sense of War: The Second*

World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Catherine Merridale makes a similar conclusion in her study on postwar remembrance, which emphasizes that after the war, people could join in remembrance ceremonies to mourn the losses of the Great Purges. See her 'War, Death, and Remembrance in Soviet Russia,' in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) is a much better example of the interplay between memorials and *zeitgeist*. For an impressionistic account see Michael Ignatieff, 'Soviet War Memorials,' *History Workshop Journal*, 17, Spring 1984.

⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1983).

¹⁰See Karl Qualls 'Local-Outsider Negotiations in Sevastopol's Postwar Reconstruction, 1944-53' in Donald J. Raleigh, ed., *Provincial Landscapes: The Local Dimensions of Soviet Power*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), pp. 276-298. Douglas Weiner, *A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection From Stalin to Gorbachev*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) also notes the ability of professionals to carve a niche for themselves within the larger official culture and to affect change.

¹¹ Mosse, p. 7.

¹² Christel Lane, *The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society—The Soviet Case*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), especially 150-152. Among her sources are I. P. Kikilo, *Novoe vremya – novye traditsii*, (Moscow, 1969); T. Mel'nikova, 'Priglashtsiia vse,' *Prazdniki, obriady traditsii*, (Moscow, 1976); E. V. Nagirnyak, et al., *Novye obriady i prazdniki*, (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1970); I. Novopistsev, 'Traditsii dobra i krasoty' *Nauka i religiia*, 3, 1970, pp. 48-50.

¹³ Winfried Baumgart, *The Peace of Paris 1856*, trans Ann Pottinger Saab, (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1981), p. 76 posits the losses in the 349-day siege of Sevastopol: 130,000 men lost: 15,000 killed, 4000 missing, 70,000 wounded, 40,000 sick, (8000 of whom eventually died) [makes 372.5 men per day lost]. David M. Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, (London: Longman, 1994), p. 289 suggests that one year fighting at Sevastopol yielded 107,000 Russian 'total casualties' and 71,000 for the allies with all of Crimean war losses totalling 450,000 Russian, 80-95,000 French, 20-25,000 British, 2000 Italian, and unknown Ottomans, (100-400,000).

¹⁴ Sevastopol's city planner Tamara Alëshina and chief economist Zhilina, in a 1950 report on the five-year plan, noted rapid population increases from year to year: 38,000, (1944), 54,000, (1945), 70,100, (1946), 77,300, (1947), 88,000, (1948), 107,000, (1949), 110,000, (1950). Since even the most basic infrastructure was repaired only in the late 1940s, each new resident created more waste and disease. *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv goroda Sevastopolia*, (Sevastopol, hereafter GAGS) f. R-359, op. 1, d. 121, l. 1. Sevastopol regained its population faster than the USSR, which in 1951, as Richard Rowland has estimated, was 11 million inhabitants below the 1939 population. Richard H. Rowland, 'Regional Population Trends in the Former USSR, 1939-51, and the Impact of World War II,' *Carl Beck Papers*, 1207, (1997), p. 7.

¹⁵ The most accessible source of press material in the West on the battles for Sevastopol remain the collection of articles translated for foreign consumption: *The Heroic Defence of Sevastopol*, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1942); *Sevastopol: November, 1941-July, 1942: Articles, Stories and Eye-witness Accounts by Soviet War Correspondents*, (London: Hutchinson, 1943). A cursory comparison shows these to be adequate translations of the original articles that appeared in *Pravda* and *Krasnaia Zvezda* among other newspapers.

¹⁶ *The Heroic Defence of Sevastopol*, p. 14.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁸ Matthew P. Gallagher, *The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories, and Realities*, (New York: Praeger, 1963) argues that military men in the field rejected much of the theoretical musings of military theorists. This seems to fit well with Oktiabrskii's writings, which are filled with emotion and feeling rather than abstractions.

¹⁹ See, for example, 'Pamiatnik zatoplennym korabliam,' *Slava Sevastopolia*, (hereafter *Slava*), 27 September 1944, p. 2; 'Chetvertyi bastion,' *Slava*, 4 October 1944, p. 2; 'Sevastopol—gorod slavy,' *Za Rodinu!*, 11 May 1944, p. 2; 'Sevastopol: istoricheskaia spravka,' *Za Rodinu!*, 11 May 1944, p. 3; G. Troitskii, 'Lektsiia o pervoi oborone Sevastopolia,' *Za Rodinu!*, 23 May 1944, p. 2.

²⁰ 'Sevastopol,' *Krasnyi Chernomoret*s, 8 May 1944, p. 1.

²¹ Petr Sazhin and G. Pozhenian, 'Solntse nad Sevastopolem,' *Krasnyi Chernomoret*s, 12 May 1944, p. 1. Their feats are recounted and mythologized in *Heroic Defence of Sevastopol* and *Sevastopol: November, 1941-July, 1942*.

²² 'Segodnia,' *Krasnyi Chernomoret*s, 21 February 1945, p. 4. *Battle for Sevastopol* can be viewed at the National Archives, Washington, DC as Russian News, (1944), No. 3A; Motion Picture 208-RN-59; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208.

²³ See note 14 for the annual population figures compiled by the city's chief economist and city planner.

²⁴ On the preparation of cadres for the Sevastopol Construction Trust, (*Sevastopolstroï*) see GAGS f. R-182, op. 1, d. 36, l. 11. The yearly report on the work force can be found in GAGS f. R-182, op. 1, d. 37, l. 1. G. F. Krivosheev, *Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century*, (London: Greenhill, 1997), pp. 107, 142-143 suggests that the Defence of Sevastopol 30 October 1941 – 4 July 1942 had the following results: Irrecoverable losses: 156,880; Sick and wounded: 43,601; Total losses: 200,841; Average daily loss: 808. For the Crimean Strategic Offensive, 8 April-12 May 1944 he calculates: Irrecoverable losses: 17,754; Sick & wounded: 67,065; Total losses: 84,819; Average daily loss: 2,423.

²⁵ GAGS f. R-182, op. 1, d. 78, l. 7.

²⁶ GAGS f. R-182, op. 1, d. 77, ll. 1-8. In five units, POWs fulfilled 139,099 'person-days' of a total 158,735. Of course the percentage of work completed by POWs dropped after war's end as residents returned, soldiers were demobilized, and labour recruitment began.

²⁷ GAGS f. R-182, op. 1, d. 79. The camps were Streletskaia, Zenitnyi gorodok, (largest at 4,000), Balaklava, Gora Rudol'f, Gollandia, Oreanda, SevGRES, (Sevastopol's electric station), Mys Khersones, Bulganak, Gaspri, Partanit, Inkerman, Feodosiia, Evpatoriia, Bel'bek, Mamaiskie Kamenolomni. Today, residents still recall the camp near the prewar jail and retell with some animosity the sight of Germans receiving truckloads of rations while Sevastopolites went hungry. Interview with Ludmilla Bogdanovskaia 13 March 1997. Although not written about Sevastopol, Georg Schinke, *Red Cage: Documentary*, edited by Gerborg Frick, (Lawrenceville, Virginia: Brunswick, 1994) gives a personal account of life in Stalin's POW camps from 1945 to 1954.

²⁸ 'Sevastopol'; RG 242 National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized; Cartographic and Architectural Branch; National Archives, Washington, DC. These bombing maps captured from the German military show a conscious targeting of the wharves and installations throughout the city as well as the cultural and architectural monuments in the city centre.

²⁹ N. Pogodin, 'Planirovka Stalingrada,' *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo* 6, 1944, p. 2. Emphasis mine.

³⁰ V. N. Semënov, 'Osnovy planirovki vosstanavlivaemykh gorodov,' *Problemy sovremennogo gradostroitel'stva* 1, 1947, p. 8. His emphasis.

³¹ Semënov, 'Osnovy planirovki,' pp. 5-6.

³² The most well known examples are the relative freedom for the Russian Orthodox Church, which raised money for a tank column, and the creation of new medals named for Mikhail Kutuzov, Alexander Suvorov, and Alexander Nevskii--the great military heroes of the past.

³³ Brandenberger, p. 12.

³⁴ For a further elaboration on this dynamic in the USSR in various forms of mass culture, see Brandenberger, chapter 12.

³⁵ Mikhail I. Kalinin, 'Bol'shaia obshchenarodnaia zadacha,' *Izvestiia*, 10 December 1943, p. 2.

³⁶ *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki*, (Moscow, hereafter RGAE) f. 9432, op. 1, d. 3, l. 54.

³⁷ RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, l. 1.

³⁸ While the first postwar chief municipal architect Georgii Lomagin's biography is murky, we know that his successor, Iurii Trautman, had served in the military during the war before he became Barkhin's chief opponent and eventually wrested control of city planning from him in 1946. With Trautman we see a combination of civilian and military goals.

³⁹ GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 16-17. Sovnarkom RSFSR Resolution 751.

⁴⁰ GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 3, l. 1.

⁴¹ GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 3, l. 3-3ob.

⁴² For a discussion of how municipal architect Iurii Trautman wrested control of Sevastopol's general plan from much more respected and connected architects in Moscow see Qualls, *Raised from Ruins*, chapter 4.

⁴³ GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 11, l. 5. The complete list included: Count's Pier, the Memorial of Defence, (Crimean War Panorama), Peter and Paul Cathedral, the Fraternal Cemetery, Historical Boulevard, Khersones, the Inkerman ruins, (a bridge, fortress and monastery), the 14th and 15th century remains of a tower and walls at Balaklava, St. George Monastery and cave church, ancient structures in Sukharnaia Ravine, the Marmara and Shuldan cave cities, Chorgun tower, ruins at Kamyshevaia bay, the ruins of a fortress near Karan', the church and cemetery at Belbek Kermen, Byzantine walls near Lapsi, and the ruins on cape Aiia.

⁴⁴ 'Okhrana istoriko-arkhitekturnykh pamiatnikov Sevastopolia,' *Slava Sevastopolia*, (17 March 1946): p. 2. The ancient ruins further from the city centre that had no direct relation to the city's heritage as an outpost against invaders were either ignored in the press or they had been eliminated from the list.

⁴⁵ G. Barkhin, 'Proekt budushchego: pochetnoe zadanie,' *Slava*, (18 May 1945): p. 1; GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 30-a, (Explanatory notes of S. D. Itskovich and G. B. Barkhin).

⁴⁶ *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, (Moscow, hereafter GA RF) f. A-150, op. 2, d. 52, ll. 1-10.

⁴⁷ GA RF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 52, ll. 32-35. This document also shows that the City Architectural Commission met on 15 May 1945 to discuss the general plan with municipal and naval organizations after the 16 April citywide viewing. On 13 October the Architectural Council of Crimea and City Architectural Commission met to discuss the plan further. Two days later the commander of the Black Sea Fleet called an interdepartmental commission together to discuss the plan with Barkhin and the city commission.

⁴⁸ George Mosse also pointed to the importance of past traditions of memorialization before World War I. See especially chapters 2-3.

⁴⁹ RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 9-11, (5 January 1945). Quote, l. 11.

⁵⁰ RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 242, ll. 93-93ob; GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 10, l. 12.

⁵¹ RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 148-149.

⁵² RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 33, l. 154. Barkhin's second variation on the plan that was supposed to have addressed comments of the review committee was presented to the KA on 5 May 1945. RGAE f. 9432, op. 1, d. 33, l. 1.

⁵³ GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 31, ll. 41-44; GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 6-9ob.

⁵⁴ GA RF f. A-259, op. 5, d. 279, ll. 16-18.

⁵⁵ E. N. Doronina and T. I. Iakovleva, *Pamiatniki Sevastopolia*, (Simferopol': Tavriia, 1987), pp. 169-170.

⁵⁶ E. N. Doronina and A. A. Liakhovich, *Po ulitsam Sevastopolia*, (Simferopol': Tavriia, 1983), pp. 80-81.

⁵⁷ GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 3-3ob.

⁵⁸ As early as 13 July 1944, the Crimean Party Committee ordered all city committees to organize summer Pioneer camps, (GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 7, ll. 76-77). A Gorispolkom report on the 1946 campaign, (GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 63, ll. 64-65ob) further noted that all camp leaders had to attend Komsomol training in order to provide adequate ideological education, which no doubt included information about the city's historic sites to which they were taking the Pioneers. Although the cost for summer camps is unknown, a camp during the winter holidays cost ninety-six rubles, divided evenly between the city and parents. The poorest 10 per cent of the children went free of charge, (GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 25, l. 51). For others, 'children's areas' were established in schoolyards during the summer for play and education.

⁵⁹ Serhy Yekelchuk, 'Diktat and Dialogue in Stalinist Culture: Staging Patriotic Historical Opera in Soviet Ukraine, 1936-1954,' *Slavic Review*, Fall 2000, pp. 597-624 shows how problematic the reading of symbolic language can be among authors and audiences. The latter, in one case noted by Yekelchuk, ignored the official message and read into the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytskii* what they wanted.

⁶⁰ Sevastopol is not only impoverished because its main resource, government contracts for naval construction and repair, has almost ceased to exist, but the city is also torn between two governments. Juridically it is a Ukrainian city, but the overwhelming majority of its residents are ethnic Russians. To make matters worse, both the Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea fleets are stationed in the city's bays.

⁶¹ *The Heroic Defence of Sevastopol*, p. 14.

⁶² GA RF f. A-259, op. 5, d. 279, ll. 16-18.

⁶³ On the semiotics of urban planning see Harold D. Lasswell, *The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1979); Diana Agrest and Mario Gandelsonas, 'Semiotics and the Limits of Architecture,' in *A Perfusion of Signs*, Sebeok, Thomas A., ed., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977); Donald Preziosi, *The Semiotics of the Built Environment: An Introduction to Architectonic Analysis*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).

⁶⁴ For a brief introduction to postwar anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union see Shimon Redlich, *Propaganda and Nationalism in Wartime Russia: The Jewish Antifascist Committee in the USSR, 1941-1948*, (Boulder, 1982); Joshua Gilboa, *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939-1953*, (Boston, 1971); G. V. Kostyrchenko, *V plenu u krasnogo faraona: Politicheskie presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie: Dokumental'noe issledovanie*, (Moscow, 1994).

⁶⁵ Elena Zubkova, *Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957* Translated by Hugh Ragsdale, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) illustrates the disparity between expectation and reality in the postwar period. Sarah Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) shows how the same system functioned a decade earlier. Many 'true believers' criticized the regime in its own language for not meeting the lofty goals of the revolution.

⁶⁶ Weiner, 'The Making of a Dominant Myth.'

⁶⁷ Brandenberger, p. 12.