

Shifting Discourses of Tolerance:
The framing of Muslim minorities in the U.S. and the UK before and
after national traumas

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Abstract

This paper focuses on governmental use of the idea of “tolerance” (based on Brown 2009) when talking about Muslim minorities after nationally traumatic events. It explores the cases of the U.S. after 9/11 and the UK after 7/7. It examines speeches by the President (U.S.) or Prime Minister (UK) before and after the nationally traumatic event. When governments speak about “tolerating” minorities, they are suggesting that the minority has traits that are difficult to accept and need to be “tolerated.” The implication is that toleration for the minority is contingent on good behavior. In both countries, the idea of tolerance justifies actions that stretch the limits of liberal democracy in order to draw a line between tolerable and intolerable Muslim minorities. This paper suggests past discourses and the governmental policy response to the national trauma, especially when policies include extra-liberal practices, shape the trajectory of shifts in the tolerance discourse.

Introduction

When Muslim Americans reflect on hearing the news of the September 11th attacks, they often talk about knowing that their lives would change dramatically and in a way that would be different than other Americans (Shaikh 2011). Muslims knew that 9/11 was going to change their reality because the trauma of the attacks would scare the non-Muslim public into connecting “Muslims” with “terrorism.” The trauma of terrorism changes society because, “horror has to do with the collapse of social and political identities and with the dissolution of form” (Asad 2007, 3). This paper asks how the discourse changed as a result of national trauma.

Definitions

Before delving into these issues, it is important to define some terms. This paper examines the discourse of tolerance. Discourse is language and ideas that undergird our

understanding of all topics. Foucault, the original discursive theorist, argues that people cannot understand concepts and objects outside discourses because “these schemata make it possible to describe” anything that we understand (Foucault 1969, 60). Tolerance is a discourse because it is the way in which its users view minorities. Because Foucault sees discourse as all encompassing, there is not a single causal direction to changes in discourse. Although I place a little more agency in the government than Foucault, I also recognize that changes in government speeches interact with many other factors (policy, the public, the media, etc.) to strengthen or weaken the discourse. Certain actors (government, non-profit, etc.) may intend to include Muslims but, as a result of falling within the discourse of tolerance, still manage to exclude.

The discourse of tolerance is used by those in power to keep tolerated minorities at a distance. Groups are tolerated because they have some inherently undesirable characteristics that can be endured by the dominant group, as long as differences are kept mostly private. This leads to suspicion by the powerful group against the tolerated group in order to make sure that its members do not become intolerable.

This suspicion can be understood as securitization. Securitization is when a topic (or, in this case, a group of people) becomes socially constructed as a security issue (Van Munster n.d.). In the case of this paper, profiling and targeting of the Muslim minority results from securitization.

I build on Wendy Brown’s idea of the discourse of tolerance. Brown is a political theorist, well known for her use of critical theory to critique liberalism; additionally, her work is widely known and used in gender studies, critical race theory, and other parts of political science. Brown’s 2009 book *Regulating Aversion*, which details her idea of the discourse of tolerance, has been cited by over a thousand scholarly works, studies ranging in topic from Filipino

American integration (Paterson 2014) to Armenian status in Turkey (Dressler 2015). Most articles that cite Brown engage just with the political theory (for instance to discuss the significance of liberalism) or use the theory tangentially to study a particular country. They seem to neither consider content analysis of government speech as a way to assess the discourse nor to acknowledge the idea of national trauma.

The tolerance discourse changes around national trauma. National traumas are experienced as threats to the structures of power and can precipitate the change of discourse. National trauma is a label “limited to those events that had a major impact on the institutional structure of society and fed into overriding forms of collective fear and anxiety” (Neal 1998, x). The events that I examine, 7/7 and 9/11, fit this definition.

Argument

I argue that national traumas in the U.S. and the UK changed the way that each country frames its Muslim minorities by shifting the discourse of tolerance. In each case, the new discourse of tolerance is used to justify extra-liberal practices that target Muslim minorities.

Brown recognizes changes in the discourse of tolerance, as she argued that tolerance was considered “thinly veiled racialism” prior to the 1980s, but has since become the “beacon of multicultural justice” (Brown 2009, 1-2). She argues that the shift in the 1980s was due to an influx of immigrants and that another shift occurred after 9/11 (Brown 2009, 2). She is unclear, however, about how the shift occurred around 9/11. I provide evidence in this paper that national trauma may provoke such shifts by causing political elites to instrumentalize the discourse of tolerance as part of their policy response to trauma. I do not claim that it is the only causal mechanism—it is not a necessary condition. But it appears to be a sufficient condition. Furthermore, Brown indicates that the discourse of tolerance is prevalent in the “Euro-Atlantic

world” (Brown 2009, 3), but she only discusses its specific operation in the case of the United States. This paper will examine an additional country, the UK.

Hypotheses

Based on Brown’s observations in the U.S., I expected to find a discourse of tolerance that shifted around 7/7 in the UK. Additionally, due to the similar circumstances of national trauma, I expected to see a similarity in the type of shift. Finally, recognizing a discourse is often created to enforce power (Foucault 1980, 119), I anticipated a relationship between changing language and changing policy.

Methods

In order to measure change in the discourse of tolerance, I look at discourse created by both speech and action before and after national traumas. The discourse of tolerance necessarily expands beyond the “call for tolerance” because the state simultaneously engages in extra-legal practices, such as indefinite detention (Brown 2009, 84). The extra-legal practices that Brown mentions stretch beyond the previous limits of liberalism, as set by laws, by prosecuting people who have not necessarily committed crimes and by pursuing suspicious policies. There is still value in exploring speech because, for instance, it is in this that we can see Bush’s “awkward effort to include non-Christians in the formulation of an American identity” (Brown 2009). Speech and action constitute separate but complementary elements of discourse and, therefore, this paper explores both.

I look at government speech and action because of their power and the lack of attention that content analysis has given to government speeches on the issue of the framing of Islam. Content analysis is often used to examine media responses to events. Scholars have examined Islamophobia in media in relation to key terrorist events in the U.S. (Saeed 2007; Powell 2011;

Steuter 2010) and the UK (Saeed 2007; Brown 2006). Analysis that has been done on government speech does not address the discourse of tolerance. I also focus on the framing of religion and the Muslim minority.

Number of Speeches Examined

	United States	United Kingdom
Before September 11, 2001	25	12
Between September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005	15	13
After July 7, 2005	Not applicable	10
Total speeches read	40	35

I analyze speeches and actions that constitute discourse both before and after the national traumas. In the speeches, I look for references to Muslims and, where relevant, identify related frames. I also look for references to other minorities in order to understand the relationship of discourse to them. I analyze actions as discourse through examining how key policies interact with the way tolerance is framed. I look at new institutions and policies that are put in place. I explore the additions that they can make to our understanding of shifts in the discourse of tolerance. The combination of these methods uncovers a discursive change that has occurred and how it shapes the current political climates.

I identify the speeches by finding major presidential/prime ministerial addresses from before the national trauma, from 1993 on, as my data. I choose the year 1993 because other major changes happen before this date. The Soviet Union just fell and Northern Ireland and England moved towards peace. The following time period does not see many major changes to society and may have fewer discursive changes as a result. I exclude campaign-specific

speeches, opting for speeches given by presidents and prime ministers in their governmental capacity. I choose speeches by heads of government because of their additional power to pursue nation-wide policies and their position of authority; however, future research may explore how officials at different levels and parts of government contribute to the tolerance discourse (mayors, bureaucrats, legislators, etc.). Apart from these choices, my method for collecting speeches varies slightly for each country due to country conditions and the availability of data.

In the U.S., I define major speeches as presidential speeches that are televised during prime time. I used *Vital Statistics on the American Presidency* to identify these speeches (Ragsdale 2009) and the American Presidency Project for transcripts (American Presidency Project 2016). Before 9/11, I analyzed 25 speeches in total. Of these, 22 speeches are delivered by Bill Clinton (all of the major speeches in his presidency) and 3 are pre-9/11 George W. Bush speeches. I look at 15 major speeches after the national trauma because they focus on the crisis.

Data collection of speeches for the British section varies slightly from that in the section about the U.S. This is, in part, because rhetorical analysis of government speech is a less developed field in the UK than in the U.S. As a result, there is no publically available list of televised speeches. I collected speeches starting with the year of 1993, during John Major's government. In the UK, party leaders (including the prime minister) give a major, policy-defining speech once a year at the Party Conference. I base my analysis of Major's rhetoric on his four Prime Ministerial Conference Leader's Speeches. Although these speeches were few, they were long and provided solid background on the frames for the issues of interest. I selected Tony Blair's speeches based on which speeches may have been considered important. First, I took all speeches that Blair gave while Prime Minister that were listed on the British Political Speech Archive (British Political Speech Archive 2016), which is a small scholarly compilation

of important speeches. However, this list is incomplete and does not even include Blair's immediate response to the London Bombings. Then, to supplement this list, I looked for speeches that corresponded with aspects of Blair's administration that are remembered in Britain. For instance, I examined his speeches responding to September 11th. I examined eight Blair speeches before 9/11. After 9/11 and before 7/7, I examined thirteen speeches, five of which primarily focused on responding to 9/11 (Blair 2001b-e; 2002a). After 7/7, I examine ten speeches, out of which four focus entirely on 7/7.

Major Findings

I found shifts in the discourse in the U.S. and the UK reflected the desire to justify extra-liberal practices. In the U.S., based on Brown's observations, I expected the discourse of tolerance to apply to groups before 9/11, but not specifically Muslim groups. Instead, I found that the tolerance discourse had already been applied to Muslim groups prior to 9/11, but did not appear often and was not used to justify an extra-liberal policy shift. After 9/11, the discourse of tolerance became tied to the idea of justice in order to justify violent acts overseas and systematic suspicions towards domestic Muslim populations.

In the UK, I anticipated a post-7/7 shift in 2005 around the discourse of tolerance. While I did observe this shift, I saw that there was also a post-9/11 discursive shift. Prior to 2001, the idea of tolerance was largely absent from British prime ministerial discourse. After 9/11, the UK adapted the American-style discourse, but only fully transformed the discourse into the British context after 7/7, when the discourse was used to justify regulation of intolerable thought.

Significance

The discourse of tolerance matters because it worsens conditions for Muslims under the guise of helping them. In the U.S., scholars have found that speech which demeans Muslims

translates into negative results for Arab Americans and Muslim Americans (Merskin 2009, 157) and can “inflare hostilities” between Muslim minorities and the non-Muslim majority (Talbot 2008, 12). Speech is likely to have the same power in the other countries, as the discursive shifts around tolerance isolate Muslim communities from the “us” group and places them on automatic suspicion of being “intolerable.” This is because the “intolerable” parts of the community should be excluded from society, but it is not obvious who they are. They often share the same characteristics (such as skin tone, religious ideas, and patterns of dress) as the tolerable group. Separating the two groups requires securitization. As a result, tolerance is an exclusive discourse. It does not totally exclude because the tolerated group enjoys partial incorporation; however, even this inclusion is very conditional.

Inclusion is a positive alternative to tolerance. Before 9/11, the British speeches sometimes used a discourse of inclusion when speaking about minority groups, even when speaking of the Northern Irish Catholics during times of conflict. Inclusion recognizes, to some extent, the power structures and history that created the group’s struggles. The results seem to be a healthier desire to include minorities. Tolerance is part of liberal multiculturalism but undermines inclusion, as it seeks to hold minorities at the arms-length space of tolerability.

The Discourse of Tolerance: Limits and Assets of Wendy Brown’s Theory

Wendy Brown’s idea of the discourse of tolerance offers the basis for this paper; however, the paper also builds on and offers corrective suggestions to some of Brown’s ideas. There are four major additions that this paper intends to make.

First, Brown speaks about the creation of tolerated groups. In doing so, she offers a valuable analysis of power dynamics that shows that tolerance is a form of subjugation.

However, I argue that, by focusing on the tolerable, she misses the importance of the discursive distinction between tolerable and intolerable groups within the same minority.

Second, she speaks about tolerance as pervasive as a discourse of the West but focuses only on the U.S. I explore the UK in order to test the generalizability of the theory. I argue that, by only exploring the U.S., she misses how the discourse of tolerance can manifest differently in different countries. There can be different versions of the discourse of tolerance, as defined by the internal line of toleration, which Brown does not address in her focus on designating tolerable groups. I also explore Brown's claim that discourse is pervasive across sectors, as well as countries. I argue that the Western relationship with Islam continues to be surrounded by the discourse of tolerance.

Third, Brown speaks about tolerance as emerging, as though it was newly employed by each government that needed to use it. Rather, I will argue that shifts within the discourse of tolerance are critical to understanding the way that power interacts with tolerance. She also discusses how the state legitimizes itself through tolerance in hiding the limits of "universal" equality. I will pair her ideas with the idea of national trauma to explain that, at such moments, government gains an opportunity, as well as the motivation, to reassert legitimacy through tolerance.

Finally, Brown presents a theoretical framework. I use content analysis to evaluate her ideas in the U.S. and UK.

What is tolerance?

Tolerance cannot only be about who is in the tolerated group but also about who is intolerable. Brown's focus is on the tolerable. She defines the discourse of tolerance as a framework that allows many identity groups to be included as part of society as long as they can

conform to dominant liberal ideas and keep their fundamental differences mostly private (Brown 2009, 14). In setting up this definition, there is an inherent intolerable group, as tolerance “designates certain beliefs and practices as civilized and others as barbaric” (Brown 2009, 7), but Brown continues to focus almost exclusively on the creation of a tolerable population.


Tolerance is a discourse of power. Tolerance “operates from a conceit of neutrality that is actually thick with bourgeois Protestant norms” (Brown 2009, 7). Only the powerful can tolerate, as “when the heterosexual tolerates the homosexual, when Christians tolerate Muslims in the West, not only do the first terms *not* require tolerance, but their standing as that which confers tolerance establishes their superiority over that which is said to require tolerance” (Brown 2009, 187). Tolerance also claims power by disassociating a group with the power structures that added to its culture. Tolerance assumes there is something fundamental about “their” culture that is different than “us,” instead of recognizing the culture’s “*historical* emergence and...the *powers* that produce and contour it” (Brown 2009, 15). Brown labels this depoliticization. The implication is that anything that is difficult to tolerate is because of “them” and not because of “us.”

The power dynamic between “us” and “them” reveals another flaw with the theories of multiculturalism. Multicultural political philosophy often focuses on “recognition” of minority groups, such as government speech mentioning the group. This emphasis is misguided because the minority group can be recognized without being included. Markell notes that scholars who promote “recognition” ignore misrecognition, even though it is a “deep-seated form of injustice” (Markell 2009, 3). Tolerance discourse misrecognizes groups by depoliticizing them, failing to recognize the historical, political, and social context of the group. Tolerance discourse can recognize tolerated groups, while simultaneously subjugating them.

The tolerance discourse is also a discourse of state power. Brown argues that the tolerance discourse creates a situation in which “the state places itself in a hostile relationship with the community being tolerated even while representing itself as that which confers emancipation and tolerance, that which offers protection to minorities” in order to demonstrate its dominance (Brown 2009, 95). The hostile relationship also results from the state securitizing the minority in trying to draw the line of tolerability. The tolerance discourse is often used by the government, allowing for this paper to focus on the ways that tolerance marginalizes minorities through official government speech.

Brown’s explanation of tolerance, however, talks about the tolerable and intolerable groups as fully separated categories. She speaks of two distinct in-group/out-group systems. First, as discussed above, the West’s treatment of the tolerable group with suspicion places them as outside of “us.” Second, she defines the intolerable as the foreigners who are intolerant: “tolerance is what distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them’” (Brown 2009, 17). Clearly, however, there is a distinction between the tolerable out-group and the intolerable out-group. She never clearly explains the connection between the tolerable and intolerable.

To add to Brown’s paradigm, I suggest that the discourse of tolerance draws boundaries or circles of acceptability. The inner circle is the more powerful actor of “us,” the middle circle is those tolerated by



“us,” and outside both circles is the intolerable. This places tolerable minorities into a constant

state of suspicion, as the state needs to “ensure”¹ each member of the tolerable minority is not becoming intolerable. As such, the discourse is not substantively liberal, because it inherently calls for the inequality of some citizens, even though it uses liberal ideas to undermine liberalism more generally.

The line between the tolerable and the intolerable makes securitization of minority groups an inherent part of tolerance because tolerance implies that some members of the community carry the intolerable versions of the whole community’s characteristics. The state needs to use suspicion to determine who is and who is not tolerable.

Tolerance is Pervasive

Wendy Brown speaks of tolerance as a pervasive, Western phenomenon. She says Western scholars treat tolerance as a natural result of “classical liberalism” in Western history (Brown 2009, 9). She notes that the practices which are deemed intolerable are non-Western practices (Brown 2009, 191). Furthermore, Brown speaks of tolerance in history outside of the United States. One of her main examples is the assimilation of Jews in Europe and, in particular, in France, where Jews were expected to forgo group identifiers (Brown 2009, 51). However, her contemporary focus is on the U.S. iteration of the tolerance discourse (Brown 2009, 5). As such, she treats the tolerance discourse as a Western discourse without recognizing how the discourse varies between the U.S. and other cases. She recognizes that there is a difference, writing:

Today, even within the increasingly politically and economically integrated Euro-Atlantic world, tolerance signifies differently and attaches to different objects in different national contexts; for example, tolerance is related to but not equivalent to *laïcité*² in France, as the recent French debate over the hijab made clear. And practices of tolerance in Holland, England, Canada, Australia, and Germany not only draw on distinct intellectual and political lineages but are focused on different contemporary objects—sexuality, immigrants or indigenous people—that themselves call for different modalities of tolerance. (Brown 2009, 3)

¹ Ensure is used here loosely, as the line between tolerable and intolerable not a substantive distinction.

² *Laïcité* is the idea that people can have their own religion and culture but it should not be shared in public.

In order to build on the claim of pervasiveness in Brown's study, I will examine tolerance in the UK. This study suggests that the difference between countries that Brown acknowledges, but does not define, may be a result of how the line is drawn between tolerability and intolerability.

The positive connotation of the word "tolerance" may make the resulting suspicion, regulation of thought, and sometimes violence difficult to conceptualize for many Western readers. These consequences of the discourse, however, play a central role in the lives of Muslim minorities in the U.S. and the UK.

Brown notes the pervasiveness of the discourse of tolerance by demonstrating that scholars who support and oppose multiculturalism exist within the discourse of toleration. She discussed the Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka, who advocates for the 'liberal mode of tolerance' and supports a model that gives group-based rights to minorities. In response, Brown argues that that group and individual rights teach toleration of "ascriptive" identities, therefore following the discourse of tolerance rather than substantive inclusion (Brown 2009, 45). Similarly, Susan Muller Okin, a scholar from New Zealand and a critic of liberal multiculturalism who treats non-liberal societies as cultures that should be tolerated only when they do not conflict with her version of feminism, uses the logic of the discourse of tolerance (Brown 2009, 192). The discourse of tolerance is widespread because it crosses many sectors and political opinions. Brown also argues that within the U.S., politicians across the political spectrum accuse their opponents of intolerance and use their own claims of tolerance to support their candidacies (Brown 2009, 3). Brown successfully demonstrates that tolerance is a pervasive discourse, at least among the elite.

Brown also notes that the state shares the discourse of tolerance with the “citizens,” demonstrating a further spread of the discourse of tolerance. She says that citizens are called to emulate the state by affirming a strong “us” and also to be “hyper alert” to the “dangers in their midst” (Brown 2009, 103). There is clearly a difference that Brown fails to acknowledge between the call of the government towards the “us” group and towards the “tolerated” group; however, her demonstration of the interaction between the citizenry and the discourse of tolerance indicates that non-elites may also be coopted into this discourse of power.

In the U.S. context, the call for citizen inclusion may be seen as successful because of citizen buy-in to the “see something, say something” program in relation to terrorism. For instance, the campaign is used in local governments (KeepOCSafe.org n.d.; City of Monrovia n.d.), educational institutions (University of Miami n.d.; University of the Pacific 2014), and even the hospitality sector (Department of Homeland Security n.d.).

Tolerance’s pervasiveness can create systemic violence. Tolerance is used to justify violence towards groups through the regulation of norms. Tolerance-based surveillance requires that individuals drop intolerable group associations in order to be full members of society. Guarding these boundaries makes violence “integral to liberalism as a political formation” (Asad 2007, 3). Understanding the extent of the discourse of tolerance and its negative results allows for the examination of the full reach of the discourse as a political phenomenon.

The discourse of tolerance, in all of its hostility, has an international reach in Western-dominated institutions. The United Nations organizes an International Day of Tolerance. The quote from Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon that appears on the top of the webpage dedicated to this holiday reads, “let us recognize the mounting threat posed by those who strive to divide, and let us pledge to forge a path defined by dialogue, social cohesion and mutual understanding”

(UN 2015). This quote and the closely related 1995 UNESCO Declaration on the Principles of Tolerance demonstrate that tolerance is the way of the civilized and violence is the way of the uncivilized. However, since the uncivilized pose a ‘threat’ to the civilized, the quote may imply necessity of violence towards the intolerable group.

The European Tolerance Declaration reinforces the discourse of tolerance as an idea of conditional integration. It defines the boundaries of difference narrowly, requiring that diversity “should not affect the basic identity of that society or its shared values” (European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation 2012).³ By managing identity so narrowly that shared values are necessary in order to justify tolerance, the document creates an impossibly restrictive model of integration that is supported by the tolerance discourse.

This paper will test Brown’s claim that the discourse of tolerance targets Muslims in the United States through securitization. She writes, the state’s

call for tolerance seeks to incite a modality of citizen behavior that rejects stereotyping, prejudice, and above all vigilantism. Yet, at the same time that the state represents itself as securing social equality and rhetorically enjoins the citizenry from prejudice and persecution, the state engages in extralegal and prosecutorial sanctions toward the very group that it calls upon the citizenry to be tolerant toward (Brown 2009, 84)

Brown, however, misses the key signifier for tolerance with Muslims populations: the separation of Muslims into tolerable and intolerable categories, as she does not focus on this distinction. The maintenance of this false boundary is what allows for the “extralegal and prosecutorial sanctions” (Brown 2009, 84).

American government officials split Muslims into the categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims and require that: “‘good Muslims’ must be anxious to clear their names and consciences...and would undoubtedly support ‘us’ in a way against ‘them’” (Mamdani 2004,

³ In 2015, former Prime Minister Tony Blair was elected to Chairman of the Board of the European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation, which prepared the declaration three years earlier.

15). This shows the importance of Brown's assertion of tolerance, but expands her idea in order to require the focus on the line between tolerance and intolerance, because the us/them claim's "central message" is "unless proved to be 'good,' every Muslim was presumed to be 'bad'" (Mamdani 2004, 15). By separating Muslims from other Muslims, the government can claim the liberality of violence towards 'uncivilized Muslims.' Therefore, the line is critical to understanding resulting securitization.

The institutional separation between "types" of Muslims reverberates throughout American and British societies. In the UK, the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, the main retirement project of the former Prime Minister, speaks about creating "toleration and open-mindedness" in order to "tackle extremism" (Tony Blair Faith Foundation 2011). The inclusion of diversity among 'the tolerable' justifies violent language ("tackle") against those who exist outside of the framework. Muslims, therefore, are separated into "good" and "bad" categories. On the extreme other end of the political spectrum, the alleged neo-Nazi organization, Britain First, uses the language of toleration to justify their hatred of Islam and Muslims. They claim that the Quran has, "very few verses of tolerance and peace to abrogate or even balance out the many that call for non-believers to be fought and subdued until they either accept humiliation, convert to Islam, or are killed" (Britain First n.d.). Certainly, tolerance creates a discourse that justifies fear and hatred when some good elements or people are recognized, even if they are seen as exceptions. The discourse of tolerance is pervasive and engages with drawing the line of toleration.

In the United States, organizations across the political spectrum tout the importance of toleration and, as such, separate good and bad Muslims. The Southern Poverty Law Center includes "Teaching Tolerance" as one of its critical programs to combat Islamophobia (Southern Poverty Law Center 2015). Its "Teaching Tolerance" website includes a section that reads, "we

fully recognize the challenge to peace and justice posed by small factions within Islam who lift up extremist theology and pervert their faith to support their violence” (Teaching Tolerance n.d.). In other words, there are Muslims who are “wrong” about their faith and promote an intolerable ideology. On the other hand, an anti-Islam organization, calls itself, “Americans for Peace and Tolerance” (Americans for Peace and Tolerance 2016). Under their description of interfaith work, they claim to “expose the dangers of uncritically embracing Islamic extremists who claim to respect other faiths while promoting hatred of the very same faiths when they think non-Muslims aren’t looking” (Americans for Peace and Tolerance 2016). At face value, these conceptions of tolerance seem totally different, but both assume that some forms of Islam are worth tolerating and others are not. This is the fundamental nature of the discourse of tolerance.

In addition to American non-profits, the U.S. government has fully embraced and advanced the tolerance discourse. Most of President Bush’s quotes about Islam highlighted by the White House archives include the word or idea of tolerance (White House Archives). The discourse allows for the different treatment of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam in the U.S.

Tolerance and change

The most important addition that this paper offers to Brown’s theory is in the way in which tolerance changes. First, tolerance changes rather than emerges. Brown talks about the state’s “deployment of tolerance” (Brown 2009, 83-84). Rather, according to Foucault, discourse does not typically change fully. A shift in discourse means “that a general transformation of discourses has occurred but that it does not necessarily alter all the elements” (Foucault 1969, 173). Although Brown bases her ideas on Foucault, she does not engage with the internal shifts of discourse. This paper follows the etymology of tolerance in relation to the national trauma and the country’s social history in order to uncover emergences as well as shifts in discourse.

Second, tolerance shifts around national trauma because it provides the state both the motive and opportunity to change discourse. Brown's describes tolerance

as a *dynamic* supplement in liberal formulations of equality and citizenship. It produces new subject formations and actively addresses political exigencies to contain potential crises of the legitimacy of liberalism, crises that threaten to reveal the shallow reach of liberal equality and the partiality of liberal universalism. (Brown 2009, 36)

Governments use tolerance when legitimacy is threatened. The narrow limits of liberal equality are revealed by new restrictive policies (such as targeting Muslims in airport security) or the uncovering of old unequal policies (such as the misguided American policy in the Middle East). The extra-liberal practices create a loss in a government's legitimate claim to liberalism. In many cases, I add, the loss of legitimacy is caused by the national trauma. This, as Brown notes in the idea of loss of legitimacy, creates motive for the government to reassert power. However, the national trauma also creates fear and anxiety among the people, giving the government opportunity to contribute to a successful shift of discourse.

The idea of loss of legitimacy is applied directly to Muslim minorities. Brown writes that, "Tolerance also often emerges when formal egalitarianism is retrenched or limited in some way, when the liberties of a particular group are restricted (as in the rounding up of Arab Americans after 9/11)" (Brown 2009, 36). The loss of legitimacy requires the state to target a certain group, leading to the exposure of the particularity of equality in liberal states, despite claims of universal equality. As I will show in the section on the United States, tolerance discourse existed around Muslim/Arab Americans before 9/11, but was not operationalized in the same way as after the national trauma. The loss of legitimacy required a shift in discourse.

Brown sees collectivism of the minority as having inherent conflict with liberalism and, as a result, does not fully conceptualize the internal boundaries of tolerance as constantly changing. She argues that liberalism "implies that the individual must be cultivated and protected

and that group identities of all kinds must be contained insofar as they represent both the absence of individual autonomy and the social danger of a de-civilized formation” (Brown 2009, 166).

Thus, transnational ideas “which themselves threaten or at least haunt the integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state” must be intolerable (Brown 2009, 95). By conceptualizing a particular type of intolerability as inherently at odds with the liberal state, she does not leave room for the state to have agency in reconstructing the line between the tolerable and the intolerable.

She particularly applies this idea to Muslim groups, saying that Bush was calling for Muslim loyalty to the state because of the fear of a transnational identity after 9/11 (Brown 2009, 94). However, at the same time, she notes that the fear of a transnational identity translates into different conflicts in different countries (e.g. the hijab in France and bigamy in North America) (Brown 2009, 173). The different lines of tolerability in each culture translate into different practices, but Brown does not acknowledge how.

Brown usefully conceptualizes discursive change as, partially, a function of the state. She critiques Foucault for his understatement of the role of the state in generating discourse. Foucault sees power as a creative force in producing discourse (Foucault 1980, 119). However, he does not think that power comes from the state or any one institution. He draws a metaphor, saying, “The criticism of power wielded over the mentally sick or mad cannot be restricted to psychiatric institutions; nor can those questioning the power to punish be content with denouncing prisons as total institutions” (Foucault 1979). In his view, power interacts, is pervasive, and emanates from many centers. Brown, in contrast, argues that the state is able to use of the discourse of tolerance to limit “civil conflict” and reinforce “the legitimacy of the state and in so doing shores up and expands state power” (Brown 2009, 82). The state is able to extend its power through the

legitimacy of a reasserted liberalism. The state may not have as much power as Brown claims, but it is also not as weak as Foucault claims. The conflict between Brown and Foucault can also be informed by the idea of a national trauma.

National Trauma and Tolerance

The idea of national trauma suggests that the government has the ability to fill a discursive vacuum caused by instability. Brown speaks about delegitimization of the government, which causes the use of the tolerance discourse. In doing so, she explains the motivation for a state to change its discourse, but not how it gains the ability to make change. Brown neglects that most events that destabilize the state (usually national traumas) also destabilize the general population. National traumas, as Brown would suggest, motivate government to reassert its power; however, national trauma's disruptive effects may give the government power to make a discursive change, because people turn to leadership in times of crisis. Studies suggest that, in times of national crisis, the U.S. president's words and frames are more likely to be heeded (Hill and Marion 2010, 900; Graham, Keenan, and Dowd 2004, 1999). The fear and uncertainty create a discourse vacuum in which the government can increase power.

In the case of minority-perpetrated violent attacks, the disruption to institutions and perhaps discourse can inform further about discourse's ability to define in- and out-groups. Arthur Neal believes that "anger" combined with "collective sadness" led to internment of Japanese Americans after the attacks of Pearl Harbor (Neal 1998, 5). This explanation may be missing a critical intervening variable: Japanese-American status as a minority group. A better way to understand this is in the context of the discourse of tolerance. It appears that most Japanese Americans had been inside the boundaries of tolerance and were pushed out. Is boundary adjustment affecting Muslim minorities in the U.S. and UK today?

There is the presence of a similar inflection point in both countries, which I will examine. In the U.S., the nationally traumatic event examined is September 11th. It created a collective feeling of fear and caused major institutional changes (such as the ‘War on Terror’ and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security). In the UK, I view the London Bombings (commonly referred to as 7/7) as the inflection point of national trauma. This event shook the UK because “it was the first time Britain had been attacked by non-white British citizens” (Cole and Maisuria 2007, 95). The collective fear created changes in structures because they “confirmed the picture of Muslim youth as oppositional to British values,” and prompted “the blaming of multiculturalism and attempts to ‘prevent violent extremism’” (Thomas and Sanderson 2011, 1). The referenced Prevent Strategy was a fundamental change in how Britain addressed terrorism. Talal Asad notes that this legislation showed a change in the frame of reference to one in which, “Muslims are at the centre of what it means to be British or English” because of questions of “‘community cohesion,’ citizenship and multicultural political philosophy” (Asad 2007, 291). The change in fundamental structures of society and response to violence with fear and collective sadness suggests a discursive shift. I argue that this shift occurred within the discourse of tolerance.

Different Countries

There are two key differences that make the study of these countries particularly relevant. The first is their institutional relationships with religion. The U.S. has official separation of church and state, which creates a cautious environment for interactions between both majority and minority groups. By contrast, the UK has an official church and is inclined to communicate primarily with perceived-to-be official religious leaders of other communities. There is a chief

rabbi in charge of the Jewish populations and the Queen is the head of the Church of England.⁴ Brown indicates the context of each country may change the way in which the tolerance discourse is used (Brown 2009, 3). The U.S.'s institutional history of freedom of religion may lead to the American ability to have a higher bar for tolerance of religious ideas. This is realized in that, at first, the U.S. intended to regulate those who enabled violence, while the UK intended to regulate thought. However, the effect seems to be mitigated by time because, as becomes clear in the conclusion, eventually the U.S. policy has stretched into the regulation of thought.

Second, each country has had a different history with terrorism. The UK was long accustomed to domestic terrorism. By contrast, discourse around terrorism was not prevalent in U.S. speech immediately prior to September 11th. The differing experiences of the countries allow this paper to observe how experience affects the discourse of tolerance. At first, when the UK tried to apply U.S. discourses, the discourses conflicted with the experience of Irish terrorism. However, after its own national trauma, the UK was able to apply its past experience with terrorism with its more recent experience.

Despite the differences between the countries, the response to the national trauma is strikingly similar. For instance, although the attackers were British nationals in the UK and the U.S. attackers were foreigners, the discourse remained fairly constant and did not often speak about the attackers' residency status. The discourse of tolerance can cross differing situations. The following two sections cover my findings in each country. The discourse of tolerance is present and takes on its own character in each country. Each country experiences its own patterns of change. National trauma consistently creates shifts in discourse. I argue that the patterns of

⁴ This point is relevant to the specifics of the response to 7/7. For example, there was an officially issued statement on the London bombings by UK 'religious leaders.'

change are dictated by the actions that the country is trying to justify and the country's past discourses.

The United States: The Convergence of Justice and Tolerance

Scholarly analyses of Bush's speeches after 9/11 in the United States focus extensively on the "two basic trajectories" of 'War on Terrorism' and of American freedom versus the evil of the enemy (O'Connell 2015, 108). Scholars focus on various aspects of these two themes, including how they can combine (Esch 2010, 366), relationship to religion (O'Connell 2015, 107; Lincoln 2003), the creation of the discourse of 'War on Terror' (Silberstein 2002, 10), and how this discourse allowed for violence (Lewis and Reese 2009, 782). These few frames are important but the focus on them has obscured recognition of other significant frames. This section explores the mostly overlooked discourses of tolerance and justice that permeate U.S. presidential speeches. Bush defines justice as both a universal value (to which every country should aspire) and a form of punishment. After 9/11, Bush uses the discourse of tolerance to define who is deserving of justice and who is a legitimate target of justice.

The increase in all types of references about Muslims indicates the effort to shift discourses around Islam and Muslims. Between 1993 and September 11, 2001, there are only four references to Muslims or Islam during prime-time presidential speeches. Two of those four references relate to Muslims in the history and politics of other countries (Kosovo and Afghanistan). The other two refer to Muslims generally. This contrasts heavily with the references to Islam immediately after 9/11. In only 18 months, the president referred to Muslims in major speeches 15 times. Each time, the president elaborated on his reference. The discussion of justice and tolerance around Muslims increased after September 11th and the discursive response to this national trauma combines tolerance and justice.

The discourse of tolerance existed in the speeches before and after 9/11. Bush's reference to Muslims before 9/11 referred to the importance of faith communities, specifically churches, synagogues, and mosques, in supporting national well-being (Bush 2001a). This clearly falls within the discourse of tolerance, because all the faith communities are acceptable for their work on furthering the same cause of bettering America.

The tolerance discourse about Muslims also related to violence prior to 9/11. One quote, in particular, previews post-9/11 rhetoric. Clinton, speaking on U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Sudan, used the discourse of tolerance:

I want you to understand, I want the world to understand that our actions today were not aimed against Islam, the faith of hundreds of millions of good, peace-loving people all around the world, including the United States. No religion condones the murder of innocent men, women, and children. But our actions were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness and in so doing profane the great religion in whose name they claim to act. (Clinton 1998c)

This is a clear iteration of the discourse of tolerance because there is a clear delineation between Islam which is eligible for tolerance and that which is ineligible. The intolerability is signified by the idea that certain forms of Islam cannot be religion (or, perhaps by extension, a culture). Here, as we have seen in the theoretical section, violence is enabled by the distinction. After 9/11, Bush uses similar rhetoric in describing Islam:

We respect people of all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how to think and how to worship, even to their fellow Muslims. This enemy tries to hide behind a peaceful faith. But those who celebrate the murder of innocent men, women, and children have no religion, have no conscience, and have no mercy. (Bush 2001g)

This reflects the same ideas of tolerance and brings in yet another: that the 'enemy' is intolerant. Furthermore, it tries to define Islam within the boundaries of tolerance. It denies the legitimacy of certain Muslims' adherence to their own religion. Outside of the American discourse of tolerance, it is nonsensical to deny someone the ability to choose their own religion because they

are not supportive of the freedom of religion. Both Clinton and Bush speak within the discourse of tolerance around Muslims and terrorism.

The difference between these quotes is context. The Clinton quote is placed at the end of the speech. In this context, the “I want you to understand” can be understood as a statement of ‘by the way,’ an after-thought. In other words, this is important to add, but it does not serve as the main message. The further prefacing of this being “for the world” notes another degree of separation from American listeners. The quote from Bush is directly in the middle of his speech and is followed and preceded by references to tolerating Muslims. Clearly, this is a key aspect of the speech. Furthermore, Bush’s language is used in setting up the Department of Homeland Security, a permanent and major change to the executive branch. This usage brings the discourse of tolerance to the forefront of attention within the changing American policy about terrorism.

Another main difference between this speech and the previous speech given by Clinton is the connection that Bush draws with justice. Bush continues to talk about bringing the terrorists “to justice” and about how this justice will help the Afghan people by removing these people from their midst (Bush 2001g). Bush’s clear connection of justice in separating (and eliminating) the ‘bad actors’ shows a change between the pre- and post-trauma discourses.

Justice becomes a central idea in Bush’s post-9/11 speeches, indicating a change in its type of usage. In just his fifteen post-9/11 major speeches, Bush uses the term “justice” twenty-one times, two times more than he uses “war on terror/terrorism” and only a few times less than he uses the word “evil.” Justice’s frequent appearance in proximity to Bush’s legitimization for a variety of violent anti-terrorism measures calls for closer examination.

Bush uses tolerance and justice to define securitization and violence’s appropriate victims after 9/11. In Bush’s twenty-one references to justice, fourteen can be categorized as meaning the

punishment of terrorists and six refer to justice as a universal value of Americans, essentially equal to 'freedom.' One reference falls in both categories. When Bush uses justice as a value, he claims that it applies to all people. Yet, when using justice as punishment, he refers to "hunting down" and killing 'terrorists'/'murderers'/'killers' (For a detailed listing of these references, please see the Appendix: "Bush's post-9/11 use of the term 'Justice'"). The use of the idea of 'justice' is so violent that Bruce Lincoln argues that Bush uses all three terms of 'justice,' 'peace,' and 'freedom,' to signify the name of the military mission, "Enduring Freedom" (Lincoln 2003, 24). Understanding that the killings to which Bush refers in his speeches are usually extrajudicial and often involve civilian casualties, it is clear that justice does not apply to all.

Justice, in Bush's rhetoric, protects the in-group of the U.S. — and sometimes those who can be tolerated — from violence. Those suspected to exist outside of the circle of toleration can be the legitimate target of violence intended to enforce "justice." Bush often sets violence and justice at odds with each other, saying, "Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them" (Bush 2001e). Yet, he places justice within the frame of enacting violence: "The men and women of our Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy of the United States: Even 7,000 miles away, across oceans and continents, on mountaintops and in caves, you will not escape the justice of this Nation" (Bush 2002a). The relationship of the military to the principle of justice reveals its violent nature. Many of the references speak about "bringing" justice or meeting terror with justice. The implication here is that the greater value of justice can be conveyed violently by the U.S. military. Violence is able to serve some under justice and attack others, an idea that can make sense only under the discourse of tolerance.

The divisions between the tolerable and intolerable create room for defining whom justice serves. Bush even ties the two concepts together in explaining why Islam is not inherently violent, saying, “Let the skeptics look to Islam's own rich history, with its centuries of learning and tolerance and progress. America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere” (Bush 2002a). In other words, the U.S. military has the right to use violent force to support tolerance because of justice. Violent force necessarily creates victims of justice; therefore, the second aspect of the statement, that justice is “right and true and unchanging for all people,” is limited. The ‘all people’ statement includes Muslims, but only those who can conform to the universal values of which he speaks. The subsequent physical abuses of justice in Muslim communities, such as through covert surveillance and indefinite detention, indicates that the line of tolerance does not cut between the proven guilty and innocent of laws, but often along lines of suspicious allegations. The combination of tolerance and justice creates space for government violence.

Scholars suggest that speech which demeans Muslim Americans results in discrimination and hostility (Merskin 2009, 157; Talbot 2008, 12). While the government preaches non-violence towards Muslims, they demonstrate that suspicion and violence towards Muslims are legitimate through tolerance. The mixed message and the impossibility of drawing a meaningful line of toleration may lead to the failure of the government’s efforts to stem and preempt hate crimes. The 9/11 attacks were followed by a 1600% increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes and a 400% increase in nationality-based hate crimes (FBI 2002). Actual violence may result in part from government framing of Muslims (Merskin 2009, 157; Talbot 2008, 12). The discursive shifts that occurred after 9/11 isolated Muslim communities from the “us” and placed them on automatic suspicion of being “intolerable.”

The UK: Toleration of Ideology and Thought

British scholarship often uses prime ministerial claims in speeches in order to identify policies and perspectives of the government but has “little systematic research into the place or the function of speeches as such within British political life” (Finlayson and Martin 2008, 446). In comparison to scholarship on American politics, scholars of British politics mostly avoid content analysis. This may be explained by the greater weight given to rhetoric in American political culture. However, in both countries, analysis of rhetoric is critical because officials deliberately construct speeches to positively portray the governments’ aims. In one of his earlier speeches as Prime Minister, Blair joked about the process of clearing speeches through his press office (Blair 1998). Speeches are also important to policy makers because the Leader’s Conference Speeches and some other speeches (such as the Respect Policy speech) lay out the policy agenda. Certain aspects of speeches are picked up by the media and the Prime Minister is subsequently beholden to his statements. The framing of terrorism and tolerance has changed dramatically in prime ministerial speech in the UK and is important to future policy decisions. In this section, I explore what we can learn about the British government’s framing of the discourse of tolerance and its general outlook on Muslims and terrorism.

Before exploring the British speeches, it is important to note that the British case cannot be seen as isolated from the events of 9/11 in the U.S.: British people felt some effects of 9/11. There were connections between some of the attackers and the UK. Zacarias Moussaoui, one of the 9/11 conspirators, studied in the UK. Prior to the attacks, he participated in a “suspicious” flight training in the U.S., which caused U.S. security officials to start talking with the UK about deporting Moussaoui to London (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States 2004). The 9/11 Commission Report named one of the attackers as Issa al-Britani (literal

translation: Jesus, the Briton). In 2004, this individual, who also has many other names, was captured in London (Jehl and Rashbaum 2004). Additionally, 67 of the victims were British citizens (Guardian 2002). The British public reacted strongly to 9/11, as the UK saw a steep rise in hate crimes against Muslims, especially on the basis of religion (Poynting and Mason 2007, 61). My analysis of the speeches also reveals a discursive change around both 9/11 and 7/7.

As a result, this section examines discourse around tolerance in three time periods. The first is from 1993, the study's starting year, until September 2001. This period covers two Prime Ministers from different parties. I examine the changes of rhetoric between these two Prime Ministers, but I also show the continuity that justifies classifying both Prime Ministers within one analytical time period. The discourse of tolerance as related to ethnic and religious minorities is not central to either man's speech in this time period. Next, I examine the period between the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the London Bombings on July 7, 2005. This period is characterized by acceptance of the type of American rhetoric that was examined in the previous section, with slight modification to fit the British system. Finally, I explore the period after the London Bombings. I argue that the progression from 1993 to 2007 across these two major events created a refined, British form of the tolerance discourse, which gives the government the power to deem certain ideas intolerable and use force to attempt to eliminate them.

Before 7/7: Toleration outside of Race/Religion

Prime Ministers John Major and Tony Blair differ in party, ideology and temperament, but maintained similar tropes on tolerance. Tolerance was not a major idea of either government. When it was used, it rarely referred to religious or ethnic minorities but rather to the poor and to

people with minority sexual identities. The absence of these ideas from the prime ministers' rhetoric creates the context for subsequent rhetorical change.

John Major used the word "tolerance" only once in his ~23,000 words of conference speeches. In this reference, he spoke about which poor people deserve toleration. A discourse of tolerance around class lines fits the British context with its more pronounced socio-economic cleavages than the United States (Anderson and Hearth 2003, 321). I noted earlier that justice played a central part in American discourse, even before it was tied to tolerance. Major did not mention justice, other than some references to the "criminal justice" system.

Major's speech does not only exclude the words of tolerance and justice, but also largely excludes the ideas. This paper is interested in the treatment of religious communities and terrorism, so I examine Major's rhetoric in these areas. He does not often speak about religion. When he speaks in religious terms, he makes vague references to Christian concepts, such as comparing Labour to a "new Gospel" and Conservatives holding to "old religion" (Major 1996). The discourse of tolerance requires acknowledgement of a tolerated group. By and large, Major does not refer to religious minorities. His one extensive reference to a religious minority group does not fall within the discourse of tolerance. He insults his political opponent, John Smith, by referring to him as "a Scottish Buddha" (Major 1993). He spends this nearly 200-word section implying that the Buddha is like someone who shirks his political responsibilities in favor of being absent from reality. The inclusion of this insult sits outside of the discourse of tolerance because it fails to recognize the presence of a British Buddhist community and does not attempt to tolerate the community's beliefs.⁵

⁵ The insult's impact on the Buddhist community received little recognition or complaint, except for one letter to the British newspaper, *The Independent*, by the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (Vishvapani, 1993).

John Major's ideas about terrorism in Northern Ireland also lack the idea of tolerance, even though the topic of terrorism has often been linked to this discourse. Even in his most negative framing of the Irish, he speaks about actions rather than identity group, saying, "No Government that I lead will negotiate with those who perpetrate or those who support the use of violence" (Major 1993). A counter-argument to this idea may be that he really is referring to violent Catholic factions and simply not saying so; however, his language consistently takes both Protestant and Catholic suffering into account. Perhaps the most explicit example of this is when he says "But I know that there can only be a peace in Northern Ireland if all its citizens, Catholic and Protestant alike, feel their traditions have a welcome place in the United Kingdom" (Major 1996). The idea of welcoming "both" traditions goes beyond the discourse of tolerance because it treats the insider and outsider religion equally. It shows the existence of an alternative discourse. This is a discourse that values inclusion, rather than tolerance. "Welcome" is also a much more inclusive action than "tolerate." Unlike the tolerance discourse, "tradition" is attributed both to "us" and to "them." Furthermore, the onus for creating a welcoming space is not placed on the minority but on the UK. His reluctance to set one identity group aside, whether this assists or limits inclusion, makes Major's frames fall outside of tolerance.

Blair similarly limited the inclusion of the American-style discourses of tolerance and justice. Unlike Major, he spoke about justice often (twenty-six mentions total) but almost all of those references referred to justice as social justice, especially around poverty. The others were about the criminal justice system. Blair spoke about justice more often than Major, but it remained unrelated to the American conception.

Blair occasionally used the discourse of tolerance similarly to pre-9/11 Clinton and Bush rhetoric. In Blair's 38,000 pre-9/11 words that I examined, he mentioned "tolerance" in reference

to identity groups four times. For instance, he said, “We are tolerant of people’s sexuality, opposed to all forms of discrimination, but intolerant of anti-social conduct” (Blair 2000a). In this quote, he draws a line between what government can deal with and what it cannot. He links sexuality to anti-social conduct. In other words, queer people can be full member of British society as long as they are not “anti-social.” This is an example of the discourse of tolerance.

Blair’s discourse around ethnic minorities was outside of the discourse of tolerance, as in Major’s speech. Blair’s speech was different, however, in that it erred towards inclusion more often and ignored the minority slightly less often. Speaking about ethnic minorities, Blair said,

We cannot be a beacon to the world unless the talents of all the people shine through. Not one black High Court Judge; not one black Chief Constable or Permanent Secretary. Not one black Army officer above the rank of Colonel. Not one Asian either. Not a record of pride for the British establishment. And not a record of pride for the British Parliament that there are so few black and Asian MPs. I am against positive discrimination. But there is no harm in reminding ourselves just how much negative discrimination there is. (Blair 1997b).

The complaint about the lack of minority representation in British government and the exasperation expressed through the list is contrary to the discourse of tolerance. Instead of “dealing” with ethnic minorities, Blair speaks about inclusion. Even his opposition to “positive discrimination” (Blair 1997b), meaning affirmative action, which is not inclusive speech, resides outside of the discourse of tolerance. He is speaking on the axis of inclusion, both for and against, and not on that of tolerance.

Blair continuously puts the burden of action on the British government. In setting up the “Social Exclusion Unit” to deal with problems of discrimination, he says Britain must maintain “our national purpose to tackle social division and inequality” (Blair 1997a). In saying this, he puts weight on his government to include rather than to simply tolerate. The discourse of tolerance also asks the minority to ‘fit in’ in order to deserve toleration. Blair avoids addressing

the causes of lack of integration but the rhetoric around the Social Exclusion Unit certainly does not place the burden on the minority.

In this time period, Blair gives an entire speech about religion and politics, but mostly avoids the discourse of tolerance. He talks about overcoming “religious divisions that still threaten our peace...Faith and reason are not opponents but partners” (Blair 2000a). The equal weight that Blair gives to religious groups (in this case, a reference to Protestants and Catholics) indicates separation from the discourse of tolerance. Major’s speech and Blair’s early rhetoric around religious and ethnic minorities suggests that there is a more inclusive alternative to the discourse of tolerance, even in recent and relevant memory.

At the end of this speech, the last British speech examined before 9/11, Blair begins to use the discourse of tolerance to talk about Northern Ireland. However, it only indicates the start of a transition that quickly occurs after the 9/11 attacks. On the one hand, he talks about victims and “the children of Ireland” without making a distinction between “good” and “bad” actors. However, he also says, “There is no place in the 21st century for narrow and exclusive traditions” (Blair 2000a). This appears to be the first emergence of the discourse of tolerance in reference to ethnic and religious minorities in Blair’s speech. It is not a fully formed discourse yet, because it does not explicitly divide one particular group, but it seems to refer to Catholics. Additionally, he neither develops the governmental role in prosecuting intolerable groups nor calls on the people to tolerate certain subsections of minorities. Still, this creates what may be the beginning of the phenomenon of the tolerance discourse that was precipitated or accelerated by September 11th.

In this period, Tony Blair asserts the discourse of tolerance occasionally, but he is mostly espousing a healthier discourse of inclusivity. Justice is inclusive of marginalized groups and is

not operationalized against any group in his accounts. The rarity of the use of “tolerance” and “justice” and the avoidance of tolerance as applied to religion/ethnicity is also mirrored by John Major’s speeches.

After September 11th: Adopting and Adapting American Discourse

Blair adapted the U.S. post-9/11 usage of tolerance and justice after September 11th to the British context, breaking with the discourses identified above. Tolerance became Muslim-focused and racialized, while justice was tied to the need for liberally sanctioned retribution. Because of the occasional appearance of the tolerance discourse around poverty and sexuality in British understanding and the total absence of American-style discourse of justice, tolerance was the more prominent trope in the British iteration of post-9/11 rhetoric.

British tolerance discourse seems to shift in order to fit with American characterizations in this time period. After 9/11, Blair partially rejects his previous class-based discourse of tolerance saying, “We reach out not just to those in poverty or need but those who are doing well but want to do better; those on the way up, ambitious for themselves and their families. These are our people too. Not to be tolerated for electoral reasons. But embraced out of political conviction” (Blair 2006c). This is not a full rejection of the idea of tolerance because Blair qualifies the deserving families as needing to be “ambitious.” However, it may indicate a shift in the discourse of tolerance away from class.

Class appears to start being replaced by religio-ethnic tolerance. Of Blair’s 15 references to tolerance in his post-9/11, pre-7/7 speeches, twelve are about terrorists. Most of them use the idea expressed in the U.S. section that ‘our’ value of tolerance is opposite of the terrorists’ values, which had previously been absent in Blair’s speech.

Tolerance is superimposed on Muslims, as occurred in the U.S. case. Blair consistently qualifies the term “Muslims” in order to differentiate between good and bad Muslims. He says, “Let no one say this was a blow for Islam when the blood of *innocent* Muslims was shed along with those of the Christian, Jewish and other faiths around the world” (Blair 2001c, italics added). In order to fit into the discourse, he clarifies that Muslims are innocent, but does not need to qualify those of “other faiths around the world” with the same exoneration. While in this case he may be referring to the specific perpetrators, he continues qualifying Muslims’ role in society in other speeches. He says, “It cannot be said too often: this atrocity appalled *decent* Muslims everywhere and is wholly contrary to the true teaching of Islam” (Blair 2001d, emphasis added) and refers to ‘decent’ Muslims again in a later speech (Blair 2001e). By qualifying both Muslims and Islam, as in the American discourse, Blair begins to justify securitization of British Muslim communities and violence towards certain Muslim communities abroad.

The tolerance discourse begins to be applied for events within the UK. In response to Islamophobic violence against people and property, Blair says, “we condemn unreservedly racist attacks on British Muslims here, most recently at an Edinburgh mosque” (Blair 2001d). The government calls the people to tolerance, while also labeling some parts of Islam as inherently evil.

The idea of inherently evil Islam is seen in the British framing of Bin Laden’s Islam. Blair says, “Indeed, there is nothing hidden about Bin Laden's agenda. He openly espouses the language of terror; has described terrorizing Americans as a religious and logical obligation; and in February 1998 signed a fatwa stating that ‘the killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a religious duty’” (Blair 2001d). This statement uses more Islam-specific religious language than any sentence that Blair says about the domestic “good” Muslim

populations. The focus on how Bin Laden uses religion and the invocation of specifically Islamic words like fatwa (a word Blair never invokes positively) may establish more overt Islam as dangerous and deserving of suspicion.

Blair also builds the tolerance discourse by detailing the intolerable. He says terrorists and “the networks and those around them who protect them” need to be fought, while also removing “the conditions under which such acts of evil can flourish and be tolerated” (Blair 2001e). The intolerable designation begins to operationalize the discourse of tolerance in conjunction with the discourse of justice, which clarifies legitimate victims of tolerance.

Some of Blair’s references to justice and tolerance identify the concepts as the values of the Western world. In a speech at the new George H.W. Bush Presidential library, Blair says, “The basic values of America are our values too, British and European and they are good values. Democracy, freedom, tolerance, justice” (Blair 2002a). This connection creates room for conflict between the tolerant and intolerant in the name of justice. It further demonstrates the active connection that Blair makes between the American discourse of tolerance and justice with his own discourse. In the same speech, Blair says the struggle “must be fought by moderate Islam against extreme Islam, by the virtues of religious and political tolerance triumphing over bigotry” (Blair 2002a). In tying tolerance to the presence of “extreme” and “moderate” Islam, Blair begins to establish the requirement of Muslims to prove their dedication to political tolerance and actively join the UK in the fight against extremism. The added burden on Muslim citizenship mirrors the American discourse of tolerance.

The discourse of tolerance is combined with justice to stretch the limits of previously acceptable liberal policy. Unadjudicated killings against a certain identity group (Muslim, young men) do not fit into a liberal justice system. Yet, drone strikes following 9/11 and other violent

counter-terrorism tactics stretched this boundary considerably. When justifying British participation in bringing the perpetrators of 9/11 to “justice” (presumably though military action), Blair echoes the idea that tolerance is defined through violent justice: “And what does this concept of justice consist of? Fairness, people all of equal worth, of course. But also reason and tolerance. Justice has no favorites; not amongst nations, peoples or faiths. When we act to bring to account those that committed the atrocity of September 11, we do so, not out of bloodlust. We do so because it is just” (Blair 2001c). As in the U.S. discourse, justice is supposed to apply to all and yet can target the minority. Justice, in the criminal justice system, means the due process determination of who is guilty or not guilty of breaking a particular law. The discourse of tolerance, here, instead begins to justify future military campaigns, expanding the legitimate victims of justice to those who never have the opportunity to see a court room.

Despite the significant similarities between the British and American frames, Blair occasionally changes the concept for the British context. First, he focuses on globalization in order to explain the relevance to the UK, as expressed when he states, “This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism but between the free and democratic world and terrorism” (Blair 2001b). This globalized frame becomes increasingly important as Blair tries to justify British involvement in the Iraq War to his country. He needs to make the argument that the whole civilized world is implicated in the fight against terrorism. The focus on globalization demonstrates how this speech is used in order to create justification for violence. The globalization focus needed to be added to the other discourses because the immediacy of British involvement was not already assumed by the general public.

Another key difference between British and American post-9/11 discourse is the British need to connect the discourse with its experience in the conflict in Northern Ireland. Northern

Ireland-related terrorism was not framed in the same way as 9/11. The frames in speeches by Major and Blair before 9/11 focused on the responsibility and suffering of both sides of the conflict. Comparisons to Northern Ireland force Blair to temporarily divorce the discourse of tolerance from his reaction to 9/11. Speaking to a primarily American audience, he says, “To anyone familiar with Northern Ireland, the pattern is sickeningly predictable. The political process breaks down. One side feeling oppressed and without political progress resorts to terror. The other, its innocent civilians dying in terrorist attacks, retaliates with force...There is no point in blame” (Blair 2002a). This is not how Bush, Blair, or any other mainstream, Western leader publically framed 9/11 at any other point during the immediate post-9/11 period. They have not claimed that the U.S. is equally at fault for 9/11 as the Muslim world or that it was a “breakdown” of the “political process.” The conflict between frames as the UK tries to take on U.S. discourse is caused by a difference in past evolution of discourse. The UK is experiencing a larger discursive shift than the U.S., because Irish terrorism had recently been discussed with an inclusive rather than a tolerating discourse.

Britain tried to adopt the frames of post-9/11 America, but American and British national experiences are not perfectly aligned, leading to an awkward transition. The 7/7 attacks allowed the British rhetoric to comfortably settle into a comprehensive British iteration of the discourse of tolerance surrounding the Muslim minority.

Post-7/7: A British Discourse of Tolerance

The London bombings gave Britain experience with domestic Islamic terrorism and allowed a shift into its own discourse of tolerance. The UK strengthened its echo of certain American discourses. Even the nomenclature of the bombings, 7/7, echoes the American framing with its similar sound to 9/11. Still, the UK adapted the discourse and made it its own. The

discourse of justice became less important during this time and instead tolerance was paired with the idea of religious ideology. The discourse of tolerance in the UK has been used to justify the regulation of thought and ideology by the British government.

Although the American iteration of the discourse of tolerance focuses on those who intend to perpetrate violence, the British iteration focuses more on inability to tolerate “evil ideology.” Blair summarizes the changes to the discourse well when he says:

it is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and minds, both within Islam and outside it. This is the battle that must be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods but their views. Not just their barbaric acts, but their barbaric ideas. Not only what they do but what they think and the thinking they would impose on others. (Blair 2005e)

The focus on “barbaric ideas” allows for the government’s main anti-terrorism objective to be focused on attacking ideas. This focus becomes extra-liberal because the pressure to limit ideas results in the government punishing individuals for thoughts they are suspected to hold.

Muslims become a particularly targeted group under these extra-liberal ideas. Blair again makes specific reference to words common in Muslim doctrine, such as “sharia” and “caliphate,” in order to explain why the ideology is intolerable and why the Taliban cannot be a negotiating partner (Blair 2005e). In doing so, he speaks of evil ideology within Islam that must be stamped out, putting all religiously Muslim communities at a stronger risk for suspicion, especially when government speech is one of the general public’s primary sources of information about Islam. Still, in order for discourse to resonate with the people, it has to fit with past discursive experiences.

This new framework is able to fit within the British experience. The focus on religious ideology allows Blair to create a seamless connection with the experience of Irish terrorism. Blair places Islamic extremism in the context of Irish nationalist ideology by saying, “this is a religious ideology, a strain within the world-wide religion of Islam, as far removed from its

essential decency and truth as Protestant gunmen who kill Catholics or vice versa, are from Christianity” (Blair 2005e). The Irish terrorism experience was never previously expressed in the language of the discourse of tolerance. Yet, here the national experience is realigned to the discourse of tolerance, by creating “decent” and indecent Catholics and Protestants.

Under this conception of toleration, Blair creates a large category of intolerability. He says that the “roots” of terrorism’s extremist ideology are

deep, in the *madrassas* of Pakistan, in the extreme forms of Wahabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, in the former training camps of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; in the cauldron of Chechnya; in parts of the politics of most countries of the Middle East and many in Asia; in the extremist minority that now in every European city preach hatred of the West and our way of life. (Blair 2005e)

This explanation blurs the distinction between violent and non-violent sects. While Al-Qaeda training camps are inherently violent, fundamentalist *madrassas* of Pakistan do not necessarily mobilize into violence. The only qualification Blair provides is that the ideology preaches “hatred of the West and our way of life” (Blair 2004b). In doing this, Blair subverts the liberal idea of freedom of thought and speech within a liberal framework. The discourse of tolerance gives the UK the justification for regulating ideas.

The idea that government can regulate thoughts and ideas is not limited to terrorism in the post-7/7 period. In the months following 7/7, the British government began to push the Respect agenda, which aimed to stop anti-social behavior.⁶ The predominance of the discourse of intolerable ideas allows for both the Respect agenda and for the intrusive anti-terrorism policy, Prevent, to flourish.

Both Prevent and Respect represent change from before to after 7/7, demonstrating further government intrusiveness into the thoughts of citizens. Both policies have a 2003 and a

⁶ Anti-social behavior is a legally codified set of actions, but also seems to have the wider meaning of anything someone does that can reasonably be considered a disturbance to the greater public. Legally, it refers to actions such as disorderly conduct and noise disturbance.

2006 version, allowing for pre- and post- national trauma comparisons. The 2003 version of Respect was called “Together” and it focused on “behaviour and disorder” (Respect Task Force 2006, 6), whereas the 2006 version focused on “values” (Respect Task Force 2006, 3). The 2006 Respect policy addressed the “causes of anti-social behaviour” (Respect Task Force 2006, 6). This “cultural change” (Respect 2006, 7) reached beyond behavior and into ideas. The policy cut Income Support further for young people if they did not attend learning programs (Respect Task Force 2006, 19). The policy intruded into family life by saying that families can give their children the wrong values and, therefore, the government must identify “problem families” and “change their behaviour, backed up by enforcement measures” (Respect Task Force 2006, 3). The reach of Respect is not as intrusive as Prevent and does not address the same issues. However, both maintained the tolerance discourse. That is, they both argue that addressing values and thoughts is the same as addressing root causes. This is not to say that the Respect policy is inherently ineffective policy, but it does push the boundaries of liberalism.

The Prevent Strategy advocates for increased surveillance of ideas, like Respect. The Prevent Strategy is part of a larger government counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST. Parliament’s explanation of the 2009 CONTEST policy claims that the major changes between the 2003 and the 2006 version of CONTEST was that in 2003 “*Prevent* was the least developed strand of CONTEST” as the previous version has been focused on “immediate threats” (UK Parliament 2010). The main goals of Prevent are to tackle radicalization through changing underlying causes, deter people from facilitating or encouraging terrorism, and stopping radicalization from occurring (HM Government 2006, 1).

Although the 2003 strategy is not publically available, the text of the 2006 strategy acknowledges changes that have occurred since 2003 within the policy’s efforts towards

surveillance of domestic British Muslim ideas. The text acknowledges that the 2005 attacks made the policy makers aware of “the risk of suicide attack by British citizens” (HM Government 2006, 3). The goals of consultation with Muslim communities changed dramatically prior to and after 7/7. The consultation that occurred in 2003 focused on listening to the needs of the Muslim community and did not mention the regulation of ideology. The post-7/7 Commission on Integration and Cohesion was announced in June 2006, having goals including “looking at how local communities themselves can be empowered to tackle extremist ideologies” (HM Government 2006, 11). This echoes the idea that Muslims have to prove that they are “good” Muslims and encourages the general public to discourage ideas of radicalism in their own communities (HM Government 2006, 33). There is a shift in the government’s understanding of appropriate intrusion from 2003 to 2006. The rise of the discourse of tolerance, in the cases of Respect and Prevent, allow for state surveillance of certain “bad” ideas. In the case of Prevent, this surveillance is explicitly targeting Muslims.

The same ideas are clear in Blair’s speeches and how they frame Islam in relation to policy. He claims that, “Muslims, like all of us, abhor terrorism... There should be no second-class citizens in Britain. But citizenship comes with a duty: to give loyalty to our nation, its values and our way of life” (Blair 2005g). In other words, the liberal idea of citizenship gives the state the right to regulate the ideas of its members because they have a “duty” to hold British “values.” The statement allows Muslims to be held at the arms-length position of tolerability until they prove their “good” ideas. Alternatively, it can expel Muslims outside of the range of tolerability for failing to conform and label them intolerable. The informal burden of proof rests on Muslims to prove their goodness under the assumption that all Muslims start off “bad.”

Prevent is the aspect of CONTEST that uncovers the uniquely British aspect of the adapted American discourse of tolerance. Prevent, therefore, is the essence of the transformation of the discourse of tolerance in the UK. Like the discourse of tolerance in relation to terrorism, it was drafted prior to 7/7 to reflect new American counter-terror legislation. After 7/7, the policy, like the discourse, was able to be revised, comfortably fitting with British experience, and targeting citizens based on their ideas.

Discussion

Changes in the discourse of tolerance across countries

The findings of this paper support Wendy Brown's claim that the discourse of tolerance is dynamic, but add that much of the dynamic nature is internal to the discourse. The paper expanded on Brown's interpretation of discourse based on the U.S. by widening it to the UK, and by witnessing the interaction between each country's discourses. In both countries, discourse changes around tolerance after national traumas in order to justify stretching actions beyond practices that are typically acceptable in liberal democracies.

The discourses of tolerance in each case shifted in different ways from before to after the national trauma. The differences in the changes seem to reflect: (1) the type of extra-liberal practice which the government is justifying; and (2) the historical discourses of the country. These elements become clear because of how the discourses are used.

The justification of an extra-liberal practice shaped the discourse in both countries. In the U.S., for instance, one goal of the government was to justify the Iraq War, a foreign military project. As a result, the focus of the discourse of tolerance was on justice against the 'intolerable' for the crime done to 'us' and the 'tolerable' minorities. By contrast, the UK needed to justify the Prevent policy after 7/7. The discourse of tolerance, therefore, focused on the intolerability of

certain thoughts. The problem of endogeneity makes it difficult to determine whether the rhetoric caused the policies or the policies caused the rhetoric. The direction of causality is an important topic for future exploration.

As shown earlier, the literature does not claim that discourses overturn but rather that they shift. A country's past discourses have an influence on current discursive trends. The American use of the discourse of tolerance prior to 9/11 created a quicker transition than in the UK. It is possible that institutional differences contribute to the historical discourse; however, this claim requires further research. Another area for future exploration may be how the discourse manifests at different levels of politics, such as in state and local governments and among legislators.

Sharing of discourses

These discourses of tolerance are also not isolated from each other. The influence of the U.S. on British discourses has been explored in the British section. Blair was clear in his speeches that he was reaffirming American values as British and European values (Blair 2002a). There is a flow of U.S. influence to the UK that is recognized repeatedly in official speech.

The flow of influence of British frames to America is often not recognized in official discourse but it is present. The British influence on American discourse occurred mainly after the 2003 end of the American case study. With preliminary examination, it seems that UK has recently passed its idea of "evil ideology" to the U.S. In order to examine this, I looked at Obama's most recent major speech on terrorism, about the 2015 San Bernardino attacks. In all of the post-9/11 Bush speeches that this paper examines, the word "ideology" only appears 4 times. Three of these times are linking the terrorist ideology to the 20th century European tyrannical ideologies. Only one refers to the hateful ideology so emphasized in British speech. Obama's

speech on San Bernardino alone mentions the word “ideology” five times. Obama’s frames closely resemble British discourse, as he says, “extremist ideology...is a real problem that Muslims must confront, without excuse. Muslim leaders here and around the globe have to continue working with us to decisively and unequivocally reject the hateful ideology that groups like ISIL and al Qaeda promote” (Obama 2015). The extra weight that is placed on Muslim citizens to prove the acceptability of their ideas resembles the British discourse of tolerance. The connection with the UK becomes clear with the discourse in policies. This year, the U.S. adapted the British Prevent policy and included it in FBI strategy (Lazare 2016). The changes in tolerance discourse are complex and interactive. Each country borrows from the other in order to justify its own extra-liberal practices.

Possible Implications

In the U.S. and the UK, tolerance manifests differently and justifies different practices that harm minority populations. The discourse talks about protecting the tolerable part of the minority, but suspicion expands to all members of the minority group. Discovering if one Muslim student has “radicalized ideas” requires suspicion of all Muslim students. The discourse also tries to force Muslims into molds. This resembles the claim about colonialism of Afro-Caribbean psychologist, Franz Fanon, that “the black man who wants to turn his race white is as miserable as he who preaches hatred for whites” (Fanon 1952, 2). Fighting to be tolerated is an unhealthy state of being.

The discourses of tolerance may exacerbate conflict between the Muslim minority and other groups, as “when social organizations reinforce a single dominant cleavage conflicts escalate because few overlapping interests reinforce mutual interests” (Ross 1993, 11). The

tolerance discourse strengthens a social cleavage by requiring Muslims to prove their tolerability as Muslims.

It is also important to remember that the intolerable and tolerable categories are not real explanations of people, but are based on the need to justify illiberal policy. In some contexts, people or organizations may be spoken of as exemplary Muslims, while in other situations they may be considered intolerable. An example of this is the framing of the Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) on U.S. government websites. On the one hand, the State Department's international policy website praises CAIR for distributing materials about Islam to libraries to let Americans know that Islam is not about terrorism (IIP Digital n.d.). The current website of the U.S. Consulate in Jedda, Saudi Arabia, calls CAIR "America's largest Islamic civil liberties group" (Consulate General of the United States State in Jedda). Yet, in 2013, the Justice Department published an investigatory report on FBI's interactions with CAIR because of alleged connections of some of its leaders to Hamas (Office of the Inspector General 2013). The FBI was even critiqued for inviting CAIR officials to do cultural sensitivity training, despite the fact that these trainers were not accused of any wrongdoing (Office of the Inspector General 2013, 4). The discourse of tolerance does not successfully separate 'good' and 'bad' Muslims. The discourse imagines that such categories exist and then justifies surveillance of all Muslims.

Future Research

The cross-over from the U.S. and the UK raises the question of how generalizable the discourse of tolerance around Muslims is to other countries. First, there are other countries with similar conditions. Spain, for instance, is a democracy that experienced a national trauma with the 3/11 attacks in 2004. The nomenclature carries over (9/11, 7/7) to the Spanish case, indicating possible discursive cross-cover. Exploring tolerance in Spain may offer insight into

how the theory is generalizable. Additionally, Brown talks about France's *laïcité* as similar but not the same to tolerance (Brown 2009, 3). After the 2015 Paris attacks, it would be interesting to observe the shift in *laïcité* and determine its relationship to tolerance. Most similar cases face the problem of different linguistic cultures. The word "tolerance" cannot be assumed to share the same connotation across languages and countries. These studies may have to look for the idea, rather than the word, even more than this study already does.

The question further arises if the discourse of tolerance can stretch beyond liberal democracies. Brown talks about the effort to export tolerance. The U.S. has long insisted that other societies should be liberal and tolerant like "we" are (Brown 2009, 188-189). Does this insistence of global tolerance by U.S. successfully translate into countries beyond liberal democracies?

There is possible broader application of the concept to Israel, although it also has limitations and challenges as a non-Euro-Atlantic and substantively illiberal case. The discussion here is a brief plausibility probe of whether and how it might apply. I began analysis on Israel, reading 26 speeches before the start of the Second Intifada and 83 speeches after the start of the Second Intifada. I took speeches from 1993 to 2006 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases (some originally in English text and others translated into English) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). Israel does not fit within this study, however, because of its illiberal democratic nature. Although Israel is not a liberal democracy, it claims liberal, democratic language. Israeli prime ministers have called Israel a "model democratic country" (Rabin 1995).

Israel, like the other countries in this study, has experienced national trauma that appears to come from a Muslim threat. The First and Second Intifada (Palestinian uprisings) have even led mental health services to reassign labels of 'national trauma' to Post-Traumatic Stress

Disorder (Friedman and Peleg 2011). The Second Intifada was particularly nationally traumatic because of its nation-wide reach and suicide bombings with high casualties. The case of Israel may suggest that the tolerance discourse can stretch beyond substantively liberal democracies.

Israeli speech has tied the push for improving democracy to the push for incorporating tolerance. In his earlier term as Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu said, “much has been said about our democracy, justifiably so. It is our duty to nurture the values of tolerance and mutual respect; to foster a culture which accepts the decisions of the majority, while respecting the rights of the minority” (Netanyahu 1996). Netanyahu seems to integrate the idea of tolerance into the idea of liberalizing Israel’s government.

The Israeli discourse of tolerance has been used about Muslims and Islam. In 1996, Yitzhak Rabin, said, “We face the terror of extremist Islam, the enemy of peace, the enemy of the State of Israel, and the enemy of the Jews which threatens the peace of our country...it threatens the regimes of moderate Arab rulers and the peace of the world” (Rabin 1994a). By starting with Jews and Israel, Rabin creates an “us” group. By juxtaposing this with the threat to “moderate Arab rulers,” Rabin creates a tolerated outside group within the world community. The term “moderate” draws the line of tolerability between those who support radical Islam and those who do not.

Tolerance appears to be used to tie Israel to the Western world. Netanyahu said, “I declare here that we oppose the description of Islam as the enemy of Israel and the West ... We have no conflict with Islam. We have a struggle with militant forces, who use their distorted interpretation of Islam as a tool for violence, hatred and bloodshed” (Netanyahu 1996). Netanyahu seems to try to categorize Israel as both fully democratic and Western through using the discourse of tolerance.

This embrace of the discourse of tolerance seems to justify violent practices through the lens of American liberalism, infused with the discourse of tolerance. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon quotes Bush's response to 9/11: "No nation can negotiate with terrorists. For there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death" (Sharon 2002a). In doing so, Sharon uses the American discourse of tolerance to support Israeli policy of avoiding negotiations in favor of continuing securitization. In a speech later that year, Sharon specifically invokes the idea of tolerance when detailing what Members of the Knesset and the Israeli public must do in order to endure the Second Intifada: "I believe that if we all act responsibly, with consideration and tolerance, while maintaining our unity, we will continue to" be able to live in peace and security (Sharon 2002b). Tolerance in Israel seems to be employed in order to justify certain policies and in order to place Israel in the Western context.

A further look at Israel and other aspirational liberal democracies could offer room for the expansion of the discourse of tolerance to non-liberal cases.

Tolerance matters

The study of the tolerance discourse is important because it shows how minorities are subjugated and how subjugation can change. It is possible for policy makers to shift the discourse of tolerance, especially with their increased power in times of instability. This paper's findings suggest that leaders who intend to shift discourses should be deliberate with their speech in times of national trauma. Shifting away from the discourse of tolerance in the U.S. and the UK requires inclusion of Muslims in presidential or prime ministerial speech on issues other than terrorism. It requires pulling away from talk about "evil ideology" and "moderate" Muslims.

The discourse of tolerance is counter-productive. Tolerance is intended to hurt the intolerable, but it places the tolerable under suspicion and may burden the whole society with deepened cleavages and worsened conflict. Discourse needs to shift in order to grapple with more inclusive forms of integration for Muslim minorities.

References

I include two main sections within my references. The first details the sources that inform the secondary research and contextual primary research. The second includes the speeches that I analyzed. The speeches are separated by country and listed chronologically for the reader's ease in following the trajectory of the speeches and, therefore, the discourse of tolerance.

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Bush, George W. 2001f. "Strikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan." Broadcast from the Treaty Room at the White House. October 7.

- Bush, George W. 2001g. "Homeland Security." Presented at the World Congress Center in Atlanta. November 8.
- Bush, George W. 2002a. "State of the Union." Presented to a Joint Session of Congress at the Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives. January 29.
- Bush, George W. 2002b. "Proposed Homeland Security Department." Presented at the Cross Room at the White House. June 6.
- Bush, George W. 2002c. "First Anniversary September 11, 2001." Presented at Ellis Island. September 11.
- Bush, George W. 2002d. "Threat of Iraq." Presented at the Cincinnati Museum Center at Union Terminal. October 7.
- Bush, George W. 2003a. "State of the Union." Presented to a Joint Session of Congress at the Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives. January 28.
- Bush, George W. 2003b. "Situation in Iraq." Broadcast from Cross Hall in the White House. March 17.
- Bush, George W. 2003c. "Iraq War (fighting begins)." Broadcast from the Oval Office. March 19.
- Bush, George W. 2003d. "Iraq address on Aircraft Carrier (fighting ends)." Presented on the USS Abraham Lincoln. May 1.
- Bush, George W. 2003e. "Iraq War" Broadcast from the Cabinet Room at the White House. September 7.
- Bush, George W. 2003f. "Capture of Saddam Hussein." Broadcast from the Cabinet Room at the White House. December 14.
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Appendix: _____

Bush's post-9/11 use of the term 'Justice'

	Speech Topic	Equal to	Opposite of	Method of achievement	Justice acts upon
9/11/2001	Terror Attacks	Work of "law enforcement"	--	Intelligence and law enforcement find and bring	"the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor"
9/11/2001	Terror Attacks	'peace' 'resolve'	--	"unite in our resolve"	"all Americans"
9/20/2001	U.S. Response	--	--	"Bring our enemies to justice"	"our enemies"
Same	sentence	--	--	"Bring justice to our enemies"	"our enemies"
Same	sentence	--	--	"will be done"	Overall ideal
9/20/2001	U.S. Response	"freedom"	"cruelty" "fear"	"God is not neutral between them"	the "conflict"
9/20/2001	U.S. Response	Descriptor: "patient"	"violence"	Justice is the method to "meet violence"	"violence"
10/7/2001	Strikes	--	--	"sustained, comprehensive, and relentless operations"	terrorists
11/8/2001	Homeland Security	--	--	"hunting down... will bring them to"	"Taliban" "murderers"
1/29/2002	State of Union	--	--	"Armed forces" "you will not escape the justice"	"you" presumably the terrorists
1/29/2002	State of Union	"great objectives"	--	"shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and	"terrorists"

				bring terrorists to...	
1/29/2002	State of Union	Related: "liberty" Equal "right" "true" "unchanging"	--	"lead by defending"	"all people everywhere"
1/29/2002	State of Union	Equal to: "the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity" such as "religious tolerance"	--	"America will stand firm for"	Seems to be for all "human" beings
6/6/2002	Homeland Security Dept.	Related to "security to our Nation"	--	"Information" for "relentless march to bring"	"our enemies"
9/11/2002	Anni-versary	Equal to "sacred promise" Related to "secure"	--	"will not relent" "finish"	"our enemies"
1/28/2003	State of Union	--	--	"terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice"	"terrorists"
5/1/2003	Iraq speech on Aircraft carrier	Equal: killed or captured Descriptor: patient	--	"hunting down Al Qaida killers"	"terrorists" "al Qaida's senior operatives"
5/1/2003	Iraq speech on Aircraft carrier	--	the murder of the innocent	"target" enemies	"Any person involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people"
12/14/2003	Capture of	--	What	Seems to mean the	Saddam Hussein

	Saddam Hussein		Saddam provided to his people	court system, due process here	
1/20/2004	State of the Union	Parallel to “bringing hope to the oppressed”	--	“delivering justice”	“the violent”
1/20/2004	State of the Union	--	--	“bring these terrorists to justice” “manhunt”	“the remaining killers who hide in cities and caves”