This paper sketches and motivates a metaphysics of mind that is both substance dualist and, to a large extent, property reductive. Call it “property reductive emergent dualism”. Section “Emergent Dualism” gives the broad outlines of the view. Sections “Problems of Mental Causation” and “Theoretical Virtues” argue that it can claim several advantages over non-reductive physicalist theories of mind. Section “Problems of Mental Causation” considers metaphysical challenges to mental causation in detail. Section “Theoretical Virtues” considers overall theoretical virtues: ontological and ideological economy, unification with physical sciences, the promise of explanatory gain. On these grounds, I propose that the view coupling substance dualism with property reductivism deserves further philosophical attention.

Jeff Engelhardt is a professor of Philosophy at Dickinson College.

Published as:Engelhardt, Jeff. Property Reductive Emergent Dualism. Philosophia 43, no. 1 (2014): 63-75. (Article published online December 16, 2014). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-014-9573-3. For more information on the published version, visit Springer's Website.